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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-015

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24 May 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

CIA Says Pretoria Allegedly Falsifies Nuclear Records

*MB1405185693 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY
in English 14 May 93 p3*

[Report by Simon Barber: "CIA Says SA Altered Records"]

[Text] Washington—Repeatedly caught flat-footed in their assessment of SA's [South Africa] nuclear weapons programme, members of the U.S. intelligence community are raising concerns through the media that Pretoria may have falsified records it gave to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] last year.

The records comprise a detailed log of the fissionable highly enriched uranium produced at Valindaba between the mid 70s and early 1990 for use in SA's now dismantled A-bombs.

According to the Washington Post, the CIA was tipped off last year that many of the documents were "altered or filled in" before they were given to the IAEA so that they would be consistent with Pretoria's claim to have produced about 400kg of highly enriched uranium.

The IAEA reportedly intends to test the ink and paper using in the documents to assess their age.

Some U.S. intelligence experts are asserting that Valindaba had the capacity to produce up to three times the amount of highly enriched uranium SA has admitted stockpiling.

There are suspicions that additional material may have been exported to other countries, including Israel, or hidden by officials opposed to dismantling the weapons programme.

Evidently exasperated, Atomic Energy Commission chief Waldo Stumpf told the Post: "We have given the IAEA very good records. I wish the CIA would come up with some findings or proper information so we can look into it."

Until the intelligence community is satisfied, it is unlikely the Clinton administration will agree to resume civilian nuclear exchanges and commerce with SA as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One problem for Pretoria, says a nuclear industry source, is that certain production records are missing.

Atomic Energy Corp Attaining Self-Sufficiency

Chief Executive on Progress

*93WP0151A Johannesburg ENGINEERING NEWS
in English 4 Mar 93 pp 8-9*

[Article: "AEC: Looking Towards the Future"]

[Text] The Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) has been described variously as one of South Africa's "great white elephants" as well as a "wasteful apartheid glorification of a few white scientists who can compete with the first world in nuclear technology" (see ENGINEERING NEWS, February 19, 1993). A question currently being raised surrounds the justification of the state-owned company's R422-billion budget in light of the severe lack of basic infrastructure for most of South Africa's people. It was perhaps with this in mind that the AEC embarked on its commercialisation drive in 1990 with the aim of financial self-sufficiency. ENGINEERING NEWS assistant editor Robyn Leary questioned chief executive Dr Waldo Stumpf and executive GM (business development) Dr Anthony Jackson on the AEC's progress.

Self-sufficiency for the entire Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) will only become possible after the year 2000 when the international nuclear fuel market is expected to pick up and when Eskom's over-capacity has been depleted, reports chief executive Dr Waldo Stumpf.

Meanwhile, through its 2000 Plus Plan, the AEC aims at a 75% self-sufficiency by the turn of the century, meaning at least a six percent year-on-year improvement between 1990 and 2000.

"Since 1990 the AEC has quite comfortably met and even exceeded this target annually," claims Stumpf.

Executive GM (business development) Dr Anthony Jackson is quick to point out that the AEC is not commercialising from a research and development base; but from a "platform of very large high technology production."

The corporation's focus during the 1960s was the establishment of a wide infrastructure with an emphasis on basic research, followed by a second phase in the 1970s which saw the commencement of local nuclear fuel production as a strategic industry owing to South Africa's "international isolation."

Phase 3 (1990 to 2000) sees the reformation of the AEC to a commercial institution to utilise the commercial advantages of nuclear and related products and to minimise state funding.

And phase four, or the 2000 Plus Plan, envisages the organisation breaking even with even the nuclear fuel services operating on a profit basis.

Restructuring

It is with this future scenario in mind that the AEC has restructured both its operations to facilitate the on-going development and successful commercial implementation of new ideas.

The corporation's old R&D arm now operates under the name of Technology Development which has one aim—"to recognise and develop commercial opportunities in the field of high technology."

And as a measure of its importance, the division receives about 25% of the organisation's operating budget.

Once a project or idea has passed successfully through Technology Development it enters the "industrialisation" phase; thereafter it becomes one of the AEC's "emerging business," explains Dr Jackson.

The journey culminates in the AEC's established business management unit (Peltek) which currently comprises a portfolio of 11 divergent industrial businesses.

The AEC's related product business portfolio, classified as either emerging or viable business units, include Fluoro-chemicals; Turbosystems and Technology; Isotope Production Centre; Flosep which markets advanced separation technology; Specialised Plating; Earth and Environmental Technology; Aerosols and Air Quality; Biogam which developed the radurisation of ready-to-eat foods to level at which a shelf-life of several years can be guaranteed; Nuclear Techniques Industrial Services (NTIS) and Noise Analysis. A new addition to the portfolio is Lumitec which focuses on luminescence technology.

Nuclear Fuel

It goes without saying that the AEC is best known for its nuclear fuel production.

However, the commercialisation of this side of the AEC business will not be without its problems.

The nuclear fuel fabrication facility (Beva) was constructed in the 1980s under the impression that South Africa's nuclear power programme would by the mid-1990s provide an electricity generation capability of 3,600 MW.

"The country's low economic growth rate and concomitant lower rate of electricity demand over the past two decades resulted in Beva, and other production plants, being operated at below capacity," reads the AEC's 1992 annual report.

In addition to an over-supply of electricity in South Africa, the AEC's nuclear fuel production is also bedevilled by an oversupply of enriched uranium internationally and an enrichment technology which has a high energy consumption.

Dr Jackson explains that the stationary centrifuge (cortex) technology was the only option available when the AEC embarked on its nuclear programme about 25 years ago.

The more energy efficient laser technology had not yet made its appearance, while the former Soviet Union had only begun developing its low energy consumption rotating centrifuge technology.

He adds that when the enrichment plant was first built at Pelindaba Eskom's electricity price was low, making the chosen technology a feasible option.

The enrichment plant's relatively small size also precludes it from operating as cost efficiently as it could.

For example, the French enrichment facility has a capacity of 10,000 separative work units (SWU) whereas its South African counterpart has only 300 SWU.

Dr Jackson says there is an international trend to move away from the high-energy consumption gas diffusion technology—which produces up to 90% of the world's enrichment—towards the low-energy laser and centrifuge enrichment.

The AEC is currently looking into laser enrichment, but Dr Jackson says that if this route is followed it would be an "out and out commercial venture" with outside partners providing the capital.

Despite the obstacles standing in its way, the corporation's annual report claims that "by rationalisation of resources, the AEC has succeeded in fulfilling its contractual obligations economically."

The AEC's list of clients does not only include the supply of nuclear fuel assemblies to Eskom, its largest client; it is also steadily building up a "good relationship" with smaller utilities in Europe, the names of which Dr Jackson declines to reveal—for commercial reasons.

Facilities

The production facilities, or "front-end" facilities, at Pelindaba currently comprise a conversion plant, a semi-commercial uranium enrichment plant and the nuclear fuel fabrication plant (see diagram 1). [not reproduced]

The end-product, the completed nuclear fuel assemblies, are then supplied to Eskom's Koeberg nuclear energy facility in the Cape.

Each of the two Koeberg reactors have 150 fuel assemblies, about 50 of which have to be replaced each year.

The spent fuel assemblies are first cooled at the Koeberg site for eight to 10 years; the first set should be ready for storage at the AEC's Vaalputs site by 1999.

In preparation, the AEC is designing a demonstration facility for interim storage, which will be capable of accommodating one year's spent nuclear fuel assemblies.

Vaalputs makes up the back-end of the AEC's activities and has since 1986 been used for the storage of low level (gloves, protective clothing etc) and intermediate or medium-activity (wash waters, contaminated spills) nuclear waste.

The AEC at present does not reprocess the unused uranium and plutonium in the spent fuel assemblies for re-use.

The oversupply of nuclear fuel services, low prices, and the fact that reprocessing is economically justifiable only on a large scale make this option impractical for South Africa at this point.

Nuclear Off-Shoots

Despite the apparent under-utilisation of the AEC's nuclear enrichment facilities, there has been a marked move towards the industrialisation of enrichment technology; notably separation technology—the key technology in uranium enrichment; turbo-machinery technology and plating technology.

Using separation technology, Flosep concentrates on flow visualisation, laser doppler anemometry and numerical flow simulation.

The technology has been applied in pollution control, the separation of gases and the removal of solid particles from gases or liquids.

The company also claims to be a national leader in cyclone research.

Turbo-machinery technology, used to develop a compressor operating in the harsh chemical conditions of the enrichment plant, is currently used to develop anything from air compressors for mines to corrosive gas compressors for chemical plants.

Plating technology was developed to establish corrosion resistance throughout the enrichment plant. Now small-scale specialist reduction facilities have been established to handle small-scale plating.

Other industrial spin-offs are the fluorine and hydrofluoric acid plants, which produce reagents for the conversion of uranium to UF_6 .

Today these plants meet requirements for anhydrous and industrial grade aqueous hydrofluoric acid.

Sodium silicon fluoride and sodium bi-fluoride plants have been commissioned and the AEC is presently constructing a plant to produce fluoride-based fluxes for the aluminium industry.

Surface fluorination of plastic containers which renders the containers impervious to the seepage of organic liquids is being developed in conjunction with the plastics industry.

Streamlining Policy

93WP0151B Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 26 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Robyn Leary, assistant editor of *ENGINEERING NEWS*: "AEC Sets Itself R750m Turnover Target"]

[Text] State-subsidised Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) has set itself a long-term turnover objective of R750-million from its non-nuclear sales over the next five years.

In addition, it plans to cut its operating budget to R250-million by 1996, showing a real decline of 48% over the next five years.

The AEC's operating budget for 1992/1993 is R422-million, an estimated decrease in budgeted funds of nearly R322-million when compared with the corporation's 1990 budget.

"The AEC is determined to significantly reduce its dependence on the state over the next five years in order to become a competitive technology leader," CE Dr Waldo Stumpf tells *ENGINEERING NEWS*.

He says, in line with the AEC's stream-lining policy, the staff complement has been more than halved since 1986. An estimated 4,900 jobs have been terminated over seven years, with about 3,300 people currently employed by the corporation.

The AEC was last year criticised by University of the Western Cape Vice Chancellor Jakes Gerwel for producing sales of a "mere R134-million" while having received R570-million from the government in 1992.

In the corporation's defence, Dr Stumpf says that "high capital and operational funding" was required during the AEC's initial phases for the establishment of an acceptable infrastructure and local nuclear fuel production facilities.

"During these initial phases, applied research and development was often seen as absorbing a major portion of the allocated funds—up to 30% of budgets," he says.

In 1990, the AEC entered phase III of its long-term strategy and embarked on its commercial drive which should culminate in phase IV in the year 2000.

The AEC's 2000 Plus plan envisages the corporation as a commercially-driven organisation, breaking even but remaining the property of the state.

This scenario also sees the AEC's nuclear fuel services operating on a profit basis.

Last year was the first full financial year during which the AEC's Business Development management unit—consisting of a portfolio of 11 businesses—was operated.

Industrial businesses in the group portfolio are Fluorochemicals; Turbosystems and Technology; Isotope Production Centre; Flosep which markets advanced separation technology; Specialised Plating; Earth and Environmental Technology; New-product Industrialisation; Aerosols and Air Quality; Biogam which developed the radurisation of ready-to-eat foods to the level at which a shelf-life of several years can be guaranteed; Nuclear Techniques Industrial Services (NTIS) and Noise Analysis.

A new addition to the portfolio is Lumitec which has luminescence technology as its business focus.

(See next week's edition of THE ENGINEERING NEWS for further details).

Nuclear Medicine

93WP0151C Johannesburg *ENGINEERING WEEK*
in English 19 Mar 93 pp 1, 2

[Article: "SA Nuclear Medicine Breakthrough"]

[Text] The Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) has succeeded in producing commercial quantities of fission

molybdenum-99—a key radioisotope widely used in nuclear medicine.

According to Willem van Zyl de Villiers of the AEC's Back-End Process Development group, initial work on the fission molybdenum project began some four years ago.

Eventually, it became a joint venture between the AEC's Technology Development business unit and its Isotopes Production Centre.

"The facility will be able to totally satisfy South African demand, which currently runs at around 30 Curies a week."

A major goal is to secure a slice of the international commercial market which amounts to about 6,500 Curies a week.

"The existing facilities which the AEC has established can be used for the production of 500 Curies a week and can be expanded according to market requirements," he concludes.

Rumors of PRC-DPRK Talks on Nuclear Issue

'Western Diplomat': Talks Recent

SK1805003093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0019 GMT
18 May 93

[Text] Beijing, May 18 (YONHAP)—North Korea, preparing to meet the United States in a high-level official conference soon, held in-depth discussions with China on its nuclear issue last week, a ranking Western diplomat said Monday.

The diplomat, who is well informed on the affairs of both China and North Korea, said that the secret discussions took place in a VIP room at Beijing airport on May 9-10 between Kim Yong-nam, North Korea's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and Jiang Enzhu, China's vice foreign minister.

Kim had stopped over in Beijing on his way to Jakarta, where he attended the non-aligned nations conference May 11-13, the diplomat said, requesting anonymity.

The highly reliable diplomat said that the details of their discussions were not immediately known but he understood that China had urged North Korea to retract its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] as soon as possible and try to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Jiang emphasized that the atmosphere at the United Nations Security Council was conducive for the adoption of "a stronger" resolution against North Korea unless Pyongyang took action to stay in the NPT before June 12. North Korea's announced decision to leave the NPT takes effect on that day.

Jiang then told Kim that it would be difficult for China to exercise its veto power if the Security Council decided to take further action against North Korea, the diplomat said.

Kim, on his part, repeated the North Korean position that it would be difficult to hold a high-level meeting with the United States if Washington continued to demand North Korea retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT and accept special inspection of its nuclear facilities by the IAEA, he said.

However, Kim stressed there was no change in the North Korean position of wanting to hold high-level talks with the United States, the diplomat said.

Kim asked China for its active cooperation since North Korea was willing to hold high-level talks with the United States anywhere and anytime if a compromise could be worked out with Washington on the preconditions, he said.

Meanwhile, analysts in the Chinese capital said they believed North Korea was leaning toward a possible

solution of its nuclear issue through negotiations. They predicted that there would be a dramatic solution of the problem around June 12.

Beijing Denies Charges

OW2005103393 Beijing XINHUA in English
1019 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Beijing, May 20 (XINHUA)—There were no secret talks between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the nuclear inspection issue, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman told a weekly press conference today.

Wu made the statement in response to a foreign correspondent who asked him to confirm news reports that China and the DPRK held secret talks on May 9 and 10 on DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

"There were simply no so-called secret talks between China and the DPRK on May 9 and May 10," Wu said.

"On the question of nuclear verification, our consistent position is that we are in favor of dialogue and against the imposition of sanctions," he said.

Envoy Denies Charges of Nuclear Activity in Tibet

HK1605073093 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE
in English 0646 GMT 15 May 93

[Text] New York, May 14 (CNS)—An article published here in today's edition of "Qiao Bao" [OVERSEAS CHINESE NEWS], which was written by the press counsellor of the Chinese embassy in the United States, Mr. Chen Guoqing, said that China had never built any nuclear research and production facilities, carried out nuclear weapons tests nor dumped radioactive nuclear waste in Tibet resulting in the death of Tibetans.

A "New York Times" report on April 19 cited a report by a group calling itself the "International Voice Supporting Tibet Movement" claiming that China had carried out nuclear weapons research on the Tibetan Plateau and had dumped an unspecified amount of radioactive waste there, apparently causing the death of 50 Tibetans when the toxic waste was discharged into the water.

Mr. Chen, dismissing the report in his article, said that the news report seriously violated the facts and misled readers. The allegation, he said, was totally without foundation and was a fabrication with ulterior motives.

Israel Comments on Qian's Pledge on Missile Sales

HK2105132093 Hong Kong AFP in English 1215 GMT
21 May 93

[Text] Beijing, May 21 (AFP)—Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres lauded Friday a promise by China not to

sell any more missiles to Middle Eastern countries "at war," and expressed his desire for closer bilateral economic ties.

"The (Chinese) foreign minister told me two things: that China does not intend to sell missiles to the Middle Eastern countries which are at war, and (that) China will be very careful not to supply weapons that may endanger the security of our country," Peres said here.

Some Western countries have asserted that China, which sold its Silkworm missiles to Iran in the 1980s, intended to sell missiles to Syria and had been requested by Iraq and Turkey to make sales to them.

"What he told me is that China will not sell any missile to Syria," said Peres, describing his meeting with Qian a day earlier.

Qian's comments have not been reported in the Chinese press.

Questioned on whether Qian meant China would impose a blanket missile sale ban on all of the so-called "front-line states" opposing Israel, or merely desist from such sales during periods of unusual tension or conflict, Peres did not clarify his remarks.

He is here on a six-day visit, the first to China by an Israeli foreign minister since the two countries established diplomatic relations in January 1992, and appeared clearly satisfied with the results of the trip so far.

Peres said he approved of China's policy of maintaining a dialogue with all countries in the Middle East, although it has continued to maintain public support for the

Palestine Liberation Organization, adding that Qian had assured him Beijing would continue supporting the Middle East peace process.

"China is really developing a policy of peace and responsibility," said Peres.

China, one of five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, should play an even greater role in world affairs, Peres added.

As for strictly bilateral questions, Peres, who was accompanied here by a delegation of Israeli businessmen, called for stronger economic ties.

Describing himself "deeply impressed" by China's tremendous economic progress, Peres cited agriculture, electronics and high technology as a few areas that offered good prospects for more trade.

As for military cooperation between Israel and China, which has been quietly developing for the past year, Peres said he "did not come to sell arms."

"It was not on the agenda," the Israeli foreign minister said. "We are not a major supplier of arms to China."

During his stay in the capital, Peres signed a cultural cooperation agreement and was named an honorary professor by Beijing University. On Friday he met the speaker of the People's National Assembly, Qiao Shi, and was expected to meet later with Science and Technology Minister Song Jian.

He is scheduled to leave Saturday for China's biggest city, Shanghai, where he will spend two days before returning home.

JAPAN

Government Urged To Review Policy Toward PRC

OW1905104293 Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN
in Japanese 17 May 93 Morning Edition p 3

[Text] A view has surfaced among a segment of the government and the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] that calls for reviewing Japan's existing policy toward China, confirming the stance it needs to maintain on various issues, and aiming at more mature bilateral ties. This move is based on discontent with China's refusal to actively use its influence over the DPRK (North Korea), which has announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and over the Pol Pot faction, which is attempting to impede the general election in Cambodia. Moreover, many Chinese policies have been criticized, including attempts at a "military buildup" in recent years. These circumstances may cast a subtle shadow on Japan's diplomacy toward China.

Ever since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Japan has poured its efforts into improving diplomatic relations between China and Western nations. Japan has also urged the United States to maintain most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China. Last year marked the 20th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and in April, CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin visited Japan, and the emperor visited China in October. In light of these events, the government's basic stance is indicated by the remarks that "it is important for Japan to maintain and further its favorable and stable relations with China," (as stated by a Foreign Ministry source).

However, when North Korea announced its decision in March to withdraw from the NPT, China failed to take a firm attitude toward them. Initially, China only said that it "hoped the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be patient in its talks with North Korea." At this point, some people began questioning China's stance on the issue. One of the causes that triggered such action was the feeling that "although Japan understood the close ties between China and North Korea, Japan had also spoken to the international community on behalf of China" (as stated by an LDP source).

During a press conference held in early April, Masamichi Hanabusa, the Foreign Ministry's director general for public information and cultural affairs, expressed discontent and said: "The measures (taken by China) are merely a waste of time, and Japan is unhappy with this. Since China maintains close ties with North Korea, it should further use its influence over them." It is quite apparent that the Foreign Ministry spokesman's remarks reflected an atmosphere of discontent.

At the same time, criticism against China began erupting within the government and the LDP. It is said that "beginning with the textbook issue, there have been too many incongruities in China's policies—such as the

Tiananmen Square incident, suspected supply of arms to the Pol Pot faction, suppression of human rights in Tibet, attempts at a military buildup, and arms exports to Iran and other countries" (as stated by a government source).

Regarding China's handling of UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), discontent has been voiced that "although China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has not fulfilled its corresponding role" (as stated by a Foreign Ministry source).

At the bottom of this trend is the issue of the PRC's military buildup, centered around the Chinese Navy. This issue was brought up for discussion at the LDP General Council's informal meeting held last month. China has maintained that it "has no intention to become a military superpower" (as stated by CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin). However, because China has set its sights on territorial issues, including the Spratly Islands and other areas, its national defense budget for fiscal 1993 increased 14.9 percent over the previous fiscal year, registering a double-digit percentage increase for the fifth consecutive year.

The official view held by the Japanese Government is that "China's military modernization will not be a threat to Japan in the short run"; however, analysis indicates that "it will be necessary to watch the medium- and long-term effects likely to be brought upon Asia as a whole" (as stated by a Foreign Ministry source). In the future, an opinion that has become strongly rooted in Japan maintains that "China should be asked to make its defense spending transparent, just as Japan publishes its defense white paper and makes public its arms procurement lists" (as stated by a Defense Agency source).

With China's economic growth, there will be a growing demand in the future for adjusting Sino-Japanese relations within the Asian-Pacific framework. Those who argue for reviewing Japanese foreign policy toward China must keep this question in mind: "Is it satisfactory to merely maintain friendly relations between the two nations and say nothing at all?" This argument could be taken as a move that anticipates a trend toward adjustment.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Minister Says Negotiations With U.S. 'Imminent'

SK1805020493 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
18 May 93 p 1

[AFP/REUTER/YONHAP from Jakarta]

[Text] North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam said on 17 May that "U.S.-North Korean negotiations to discuss the nuclear issue are imminent [imbak]." He added that dialogue with the United States is the only way to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue

which was caused by North Korea's declaration of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that there can be no other way.

Kim Yong-nam said this during a news conference in Jakarta. He is in Indonesia attending a meeting of the Nonaligned Movement Ministerial Committee. He also said: "If the UN Security Council, instigated by the United States, adopts a resolution to take additional measures, North Korea will consider this to be a declaration of war and resolutely respond to it [sonjonpogoro kanjuhago tanhohidaecho hagetta]."

Indonesia, Malaysia Seek Softer U.S. Line on DPRK

BK1905055093 Hong Kong AFP in English 0508 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] SINGAPORE, May 19 (AFP)—Indonesia and Malaysia are seeking support from other Southeast Asian countries to persuade the United States to soften demands that North Korea open suspected nuclear facilities to inspection, diplomats said Wednesday.

The diplomats said that senior officials from the two countries told their counterparts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that Washington should be more evenhanded in dealing with Pyongyang after failing to make similar demands on other countries.

"No demands have been made on South Africa and Israel for example. Both are said to have nuclear weapons," a senior Malaysian official said, adding that while there was a need for inspections, the United States should not appear to be deliberately penalising North Korea. The South African government confirmed recently that it did possess nuclear weapons until their recent destruction.

Diplomats said that Indonesian and Malaysian officials spelt out their position at the first-ever ASEAN talks solely devoted to security matters in the Asia-Pacific region currently underway here.

The talks at senior officials level will be expanded Thursday to include the United States, Japan, South Korea, Canada, the European Community, Australia and New Zealand.

Regional diplomats said that Indonesia and Malaysia argued that one standard should apply to all countries and that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international organisation, should not appear to be an American tool. They said that Indonesia and Malaysia argued that their approach would not only reduce tension in the Korean peninsula but might also give North Korea sufficient face for a dignified return to the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty].

The Indonesian and Malaysian initiative comes amidst moves by U.S. and North Korean diplomats in New York for a top-level meeting to resolve the issue, according to news reports.

North Korean envoys have visited both Indonesia and Malaysia since Pyongyang announced on March 12 that it was withdrawing from the NPT and closing its nuclear installations to inspections by the IAEA. All three countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) currently chaired by Indonesia.

North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam said in Jakarta Tuesday that Pyongyang wanted negotiations on the issue and told his Indonesian counterpart Ali Alatas that NAM should support his government's position.

Regional diplomats said that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord was expected to brief the expanded ASEAN talks here on the Korean problem but it was unclear whether there would be substantive discussions on the nuclear issue.

The ASEAN groups Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

U.S. Nuclear Control Institute Director Criticized

SK2105055193 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0500 GMT 21 May 93

["Insidious Attempt"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 21 (KCNA)—Paul Leventhal, director of the U.S. Nuclear Control Institute, a civilian research body, and others recently contended that the responsibility for nuclear inspection should be transferred from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the UN Security Council which has a "legal power".

A sinister intention is lurking behind their queer remarks, a NODONG SINMUN analyst today says, and goes on:

It is well known a fact that the IAEA Secretariat is acting under the manipulation of the United States.

Following the United States, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat lost impartiality and went so far as to adopt a "resolution on special inspection" against the DPRK.

Having reduced the IAEA Secretariat to its pliable tool, the United States now seeks to freely use even the UN Security Council in attaining its insidious political aims.

It has already used the world body for its sinister purpose. Typical of it is the unreasonable "resolution" adopted on May 11 regarding the DPRK's "nuclear problem".

The basic mission of the UN Security Council is to discuss and check acts of wrecking world peace and security.

The DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] is a just step to defend the national sovereignty and supreme interests of the country.

The United States was the first in the world to produce nuclear weapons and has the largest stock of them. It is the very one that is gravely threatening the DPRK, a non-nuclear state, by nuclear means, by abusing even the IAEA's statute, NPT and safeguards agreement.

If the UN Security Council is in a fair position, it must discuss the criminal acts of the United States, the assailant, not the DPRK, the victim, and mete out a deserving punishment to it.

Yet, the United States is wirepulling the UN Security Council to reverse the assailant and the victim.

The UN Security Council and the IAEA Secretariat should not play into the hands of the superpower but adhere to its principles of international justice and impartiality in keeping with their missions

Envoys in China, Russia Comment on UN Resolution

SK1705143493 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 2200 GMT 15 May 93

[Text] DPRK Embassies in China and Russia held news conferences on 13 May denouncing the unreasonable resolution by the UN Security Council. Reporters from the Chinese and Russian newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting stations, and correspondents from various countries participated in the news conferences. Speeches were made by our country's ambassadors first.

They said that on 12 May, a spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the UN Security Council's adopting an unreasonable resolution concerning our country's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT]. They said that joining or withdrawing from an international treaty is an issue related to each country's sovereign right. They emphasized that our withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive measure stemming from an abnormal situation because the country's supreme interest was under a grave threat.

They said, moreover, that there is neither legitimate justification nor validity for the United Nations adopting some kind of resolution under the pretext of our withdrawal from the NPT. They revealed that there is no regulation in the UN Charter stipulating that a member country of an international treaty cannot withdraw from a treaty. There is also no regulation for making an issue of a member country's withdrawal from a treaty. They claimed that the UN Security Council's double-standard policy of giving tacit approval for the offender while putting pressure on the victim cannot be justified in any way.

They continued to say that the government of our republic recognizes the UN Security Council's resolution as internal interference in the DPRK's affairs and a grave infringement on its sovereign right, and thus resolutely denounces it.

They said that negotiations between the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and our country is maturing and the possibility for holding DPRK-U.S. negotiations is now visible. They stated that a barrier was created in the negotiations because an unreasonable resolution was adopted at this time. They said that this shows that the United States is clinging to forcible measures, not negotiations, and that the UN Security Council is being used by the United States in its maneuver to smash [apsal] our socialist system.

They said that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula cannot be resolved through methods of forced measures or pressure. They pointed out that the UN Security Council, following the United States lead, and some member countries should not miscalculate our position and efforts to resolve the issue by way of negotiations as weakness.

They emphasized that if the UN Security Council forcibly carries out unreasonable oppressive maneuvers such as some kind of sanctions based on this resolution, it will be inevitable for us to view this as some kind of declaration of war against us.

They said that the culprit that developed the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is the United States, and the country that initiated the adoption of the resolution is also the United States. They warned that therefore, the United States will have to be wholly responsible for all consequences arising therefrom.

In conclusion, they emphasized that the United States should realize that they are responsible for this problem and respond to negotiations with a sincere attitude. They then answered questions by reporters.

Daily Demands Japan 'Stop Stockpiling Plutonium'

SK1505053593 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0457 GMT 15 May 93

["NODONG SINMUN Raps Japan's Nuclear Power Ambitions"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 15 (KCNA)—Japan, having brought in top secrecy more than one ton of plutonium from the UK, plans to ship in 26 more tons of it by the end of the 1990s. This eloquently shows what a dangerous extent Japan has gone to in its moves to become a nuclear power, declares NODONG SINMUN today.

The news analyst says:

Early last year, Japan worked out a plan to secure 400 tons of plutonium in 30 years to come.

Japan's scheme is to stockpile a huge amount of plutonium and make nuclear weapons any moment. Having long since set up a nuclear delivery system and made preparations to manufacture nuclear weapons, Japan has acquired the capacity of producing nuclear weapons any time, once determined.

In case Japan mass-produces nuclear weapons and supplies them to the "self-defence forces" that have begun proceeding overseas in real earnest, the danger will be immeasurable.

Japan's talk about "peaceful purposes" and outcries over the fictitious "nuclear problem" of the DPRK are a ruse to conceal its nuclear power ambitions.

If Japan continues to seek nuclear armament, ignoring denunciation by the peaceloving people in Asia and the world, it will bring great disasters on its own head.

The Japanese ruling circles must not pursue nuclear armament and must stop stockpiling plutonium.

Daily Accuses Japan of Having Nuclear Ambitions

*SK1605091093 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0837 GMT 16 May 93*

["Japan Must Not Act Rashly"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 16 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN in an article today notes that the Japanese reactionaries are getting more greedy in its invariable ambition to dominate Asia. Warning the Japanese ruling circles not to act rashly, the author of the article says:

The Japanese reactionary ruling circles are displaying feverish activities to put pressure on the DPRK in collusion with international reactionaries, spreading the false rumour that the DPRK decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in order to avoid international supervision and control.

The fuss made by the Japanese ruling circles over the fictitious "nuclear arms development" of the DPRK is an expression of their vicious hostile policy toward the DPRK and is aimed at stifling our socialist system.

It also aims at finding a pretext for stepping up the conversion of Japan into a military power and its nuclear armament.

The Japanese reactionaries scheme to appear in the world political arena as a military power and nuclear power commensurate with their economic potential.

Japan's nuclear armament has reached a very grave stage.

Having increased nuclear potentials in secrecy behind the "non-nuclear" and "peace" curtain. Japan can now become a nuclear power once determined. Japan's nuclear potentials come high on the world's list.

Japan has legalized troop dispatch overseas under the cloak of "U.N. Peacekeeping Operation". It is very dangerous for the Japanese Armed Forces incomparably stronger than the old "imperial army" in military equipment and fire power to embark on the road of overseas aggression with nuclear weapons.

The sharp edge of Japan's Armed Forces is directed against Korea.

To stage a comeback to Korea and conquer the vast expanse of Asia is what the Japanese ruling circles plan.

Frustration of Japan's move to become a military power and nuclear armament is an important requirement for peace and security in Asia.

The Asian people are watching Japan's movements with vigilance. The Japanese ruling circles must not act rashly.

IAEA Director-General Urges Opening Two Yongbyon Sites

*SK2105013293 Seoul YONHAP in English 0116 GMT
21 May 93*

[Text] Washington, May 21 (YONHAP)—Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), says that North Korea will have to open its two "suspect" military installations in Yongbyon to IAEA inspections in order for the nuclear issue to be solved.

Blix hinted Thursday that the IAEA would not insist on calling the inspection "special" if North Korea allows practical checking of those two sites.

"What is important is the transparency," Blix said. This means that North Korea will have to report all the nuclear materials it possesses and prove they are being used peacefully or stored, he said.

Blix made the comment when asked if he believes that the North Korean nuclear issue can be resolved without special inspections.

Earlier, speaking at a press conference sponsored by the Atlantic Council, Blix said he saw a slight opening but certainly no breakthrough in North Korea's refusal to allow outside nuclear inspection inns.

North Korea had allowed a team of three IAEA experts to conduct routine inspections of some facilities last week, but it has yet to permit the IAEA to take a look at two suspected sites in Yongbyon that Pyongyang claims are military facilities.

The IAEA had to inspect any facilities, be they in North or in South Korea, that involved the nuclear safeguards agreement, Blix said, hinting that the IAEA could ask South Korea for inspections of its nuclear facilities if need be.

The IAEA was ready to negotiate with North Korea at any time, Blix said, adding: "We are awaiting word from North Korea."

In a separate interview, Blix said the IAEA was prepared to investigate nuclear waste materials the Soviet Union was said to have dumped in the East Sea if the Russian and Japanese Governments asked.

Daily Condemns ROK-Israeli Cooperation on Data Sharing

SK1505112593 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1057 GMT 15 May 93

["Despicable Conspiracy"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 15 (KCNA)—The South Korean and Israeli authorities are strengthening bilateral "cooperation" between their intelligence agencies to cope with the "nuclear program" of the DPRK, according to foreign press reports.

MINJU CHOSON today denounces the despicable conspiracy between the South Korean puppets and Israel as an open anti-DPRK move.

The news analyst says:

It is an unpardonable criminal act for the South Korean puppets to conspire with Israel over our "nuclear problem," after clinging to the coattails of the U.S. and Japanese masters.

Still more grave is that the South Korean puppets are working hard to learn from Israel's "experience" and get its data in bombing Iraq's atomic reactor in 1981.

This means that they intend to make a surprise attack on specific targets in the DPRK by Israel's bombing method. This clearly shows how undisguised their anti-DPRK moves have become.

Their despicable conspiracy and anti-DPRK moves are bound to go awry.

ROK's Arms 'Buildup' Denounced

SK1505090993 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0013 GMT 13 May 93

[NODONG SINMUN 13 May special article: "We Condemn the Yulgok Project"]

[Text] The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: The South Korean authorities are continuously preparing for war and kicking up military provocation maneuvers, even though they are babbling about peaceful reunification.

The arms buildup maneuvers which the successive South Korean rulers had pursued under the name of the Yulgok Project have recently been disclosed in South Korea. The South Korean authorities and military leaders have reportedly spent more than 30 percent of their defense budgets in the Yulgok Project, aimed at modernizing the puppet forces' equipment, since the mid-1970's. The total amount spent so far reportedly is approximately 32 trillion won. This is an example that shows how vigorously the South Korean authorities have accelerated the arms buildup designed to prepare for a war of northward aggression.

Yi Yulgok is a politician who lived in the 16th century in the feudal Yi dynasty and who insisted that a 100,000-man army be built to repel outside forces' aggression. However, the South Korean rulers have frantically carried out an arms buildup project named after his name to do harm to their fellow countrymen in collusion with outside forces. This in itself is a defamation of our ancestors and a betrayal to the nation.

The details of the Yulgok project which has been carried out in South Korea clearly show the project's antinational nature. In carrying out the puppet army's modernization project, called the Yulgok project, the successive South Korean rulers have focused on accelerating preparations for a war of northward invasion by bringing in weapons and military equipment worth \$2 billion a year from the United States. They include a variety of fighter planes, missiles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, radars, optical equipment, and even shovels. Given the fact that the South Korean military leaders, under the name of diversifying countries from which they import weapons, have in recent years frantically tried to import Mistral anti-air missiles, submarines, and other ultra-modern weapons and equipment from West European countries, it is not difficult to imagine how frantically they have been building up their armed forces.

The South Korean authorities and military leaders have babbled about the nonexistent threats of southward invasion and their inferiority in military strength to the North to justify their military buildup maneuvers. This is a mere sophism that cannot convince anyone. All the people in the world know that we have advanced a proposal for arms reduction talks, an all-inclusive peace plan, and numerous other peace proposals to remove the danger of war from the Korean peninsula and ease tension there and made every sincere effort to implement these proposals.

On the Korean peninsula, threats come from the South, where almost one million puppet troops, approximately 40,000 of the U.S. imperialist troops of aggression, and even approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons are deployed. Nevertheless, the South Korean rulers have brought in an enormous amount of weapons to systematically modernize the puppet army's equipment. This again clearly shows to the world how persistently they have maneuvered to fulfill their ambition for northward aggression.

What is all the more grave is the fact that the Yulgok project, which the South Korean authorities have carried out, has not been limited to the buildup of conventional weapons. The nuclear weapons development maneuvers which the South Korean rulers have frantically pursued while babbling about acquiring a capability for self-reliant national defense have been part of the Yulgok project. South Korea's independent nuclear weapons development is not a possibility but is almost a reality.

South Korea is further accelerating its arms buildup today under the Yulgok project. South Korea will spend

\$3.1 trillion won, from the defense budget for 1993, to import weapons and develop defense industries. Projects to acquire next-generation fighters for the Air Force, K-1 tanks for the Army, and technologies to build destroyers and submarines for the Navy are known secrets. It has also been discovered that the South Korean military leaders have been spending an enormous amount of money in independently developing nuclear weapons by using the North's nuclear issue as a pretext.

The maneuvers by the South Korean warmongers to maintain the U.S. imperialist forces of aggression in South Korea and sharpen swords to provoke a new war against their fellow countrymen are intolerable antinational, antipeace crimes.

The Yulgok project arouses indignation among South Korean people because it has served opportunities for corruption in South Korea. As recently exposed, the South Korean military leaders have illegally accumulated an enormous amount of money while carrying out the Yulgok project. As South Korean media have reported, the Yulgok project is appropriate for funneling illicit money because it has been carried out under the pretext of protecting military secrets. The South Korean military leaders have stolen several billions or tens of billions of won from the budget for acquiring weapons. Several people in the military amassed fortunes by illegal means. Therefore, there may be a shortage of investigators if all of them should be questioned.

It has also been recently revealed that the Yulgok project has also been used as a means to make political funds for the rulers, in addition to being a means for military leaders to amass fortunes.

These days, the South Korean authorities and military leaders are trying to hush up the irregularities and corruption, which they committed under the Yulgok project, in the name of in-house inspection. This is intended, in part, to prevent the disclosure of any more military leaders who illicitly amassed fortunes: The real objective is to conceal their crime of even secretly developing nuclear weapons.

A South Korean media source has recently stated that Yi Yulgok would cry in his grave if he knew that the successive South Korean rulers built up their armed forces under the Yulgok project to provoke war against their fellow countrymen and used the project as an opportunity to illicitly amass fortunes.

The South Korean people strongly denounce the traitors of the nation who are following outside forces, building up the armed forces, and rushing along the road toward a fratricidal war. If the South Korean authorities intend to carry out civilian political policies, they must immediately stop their arms buildup maneuvers aimed at northward invasion and embark on the road toward national unity under the banner of great unity, the 10-point program of great unity of the entire nation.

The present situation on the Korean peninsula demands that our fellow countrymen join forces to deter outside forces' aggression and intervention without pursuing confrontation within the nation and spending the nation's energy in a meaningless internecine war. If the South Korean authorities and military leaders challenge the national aspirations and continuously embark on the road toward war against their fellow countrymen, they will not be able to avoid destruction.

SOUTH KOREA

Legislature Passes Bill on Peninsula Denuclearization

SK1905033093 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
19 May 93 p 1

[Excerpt] The National Assembly passed a score of bills and a resolution in its plenary session yesterday. [passage omitted]

In the plenary session, lawmakers passed a resolution calling on North Korea to retract its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to fully comply with the resolution the U.N. Security Council issued.

The resolution calls upon Pyongyang to accept the mutual inspections provided in the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and abandon the possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

The resolution warns that if Pyongyang fails to retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT despite Seoul's sincere efforts to resolve the issue peacefully, it will be held entirely responsible for all the consequences. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry Announces ROK To Become Part of OECD

SK2105065093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0615 GMT
21 May 93

[Text] Seoul, May 21 (YONHAP)—South Korea will become a member of the nuclear energy agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Monday, the Foreign Ministry announced Friday.

The agency, which succeeded the European Nuclear Energy Agency in 1972, promotes production and use of atomic energy for peaceful use and coordinates international cooperation and policy for the purpose.

Officials said they hope to receive much nuclear technology and information from advanced countries and link up with research and development projects available for agency members.

South Korea is currently a member of two OECD sectors—the shipbuilding and development centers—and has observer status on the trade committee.

Unification Minister Discusses N-S Issues

SK1505235293 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
15 May 93 p 22

[Interview with Han Wan-sang, deputy prime minister and minister of the Board of National Unification, by Yi Won-sop, member of the editorial staff of the HANGYORE SINMUN political department—place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Yi Won-sop] Two months have already passed since North Korea announced that it will withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. How does the government understand the intention of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT? Also what is the government's countermeasure regarding this matter?

[Han Wan-sang] Up until now North Korea has received inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on six occasions. However, in connection with North Korea's nuclear issue, the IAEA discovered that there were differences between the content of the report submitted by North Korea and what the IAEA found out in the process of inspection. Therefore, the IAEA requested that North Korea receive special inspection on its two nuclear reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon. North Korea is claiming that these two facilities are military bases. I believe North Korea felt some kind of threat in its security because of the resumption of the Team Spirit military exercise. A self-defensive measure in this connection was none other than the NPT withdrawal. It seems that another reason for the withdrawal was because of North Korea's dissatisfaction over the NPT system. Ultimately, North Korea would have been aware that some kind of crisis would occur if it remained in the NPT while receiving continuous pressure. It seems that North Korea was also aware of the fact that it can no longer avoid international pressure regarding its nuclear issue. In addition I believe North Korea decided to withdraw from the NPT to continue to develop nuclear weapons by buying time, use this as a card for negotiations with the United States, and strengthen its system.

Primarily since North Korea's NPT withdrawal is a problem between the IAEA and the North Korean authorities, the government is of the position that to resolve this issue we should cooperate in the international mutual assistance system.

At the same time, because this issue is also an internal issue, I believe that ultimately the South and North have to resolve this issue.

[Yi] Many people point out that in connection with North Korea's nuclear issue the government is dealing

with this issue by following U.S. policy. Some people say that the nuclear issue can be resolved by promoting economic cooperation.

[Han] The current government is putting forth national welfare and coexistence and coprosperity as the basis of its policy. In other words it is to allow North Korea, the other half of our nation, to solve its problem voluntarily. It seems that this kind of principle is being held back because it is being linked with the nuclear issue, but on the whole that is not so.

As can be seen from the measure taken allowing Mr. Yi In-mo to return to North Korea, the government is allowing various South-North contacts from the humanitarian and cultural exchange level.

People say that we linked economic cooperation with the nuclear issue but this is limited only to large-scale capital investment and joint venture projects. Currently exchanges of goods and trade in various forms are being carried out actively. Right at this time in a third region, our businessmen are having business talks with North Korean authorities.

[Yi] There are people who view that to resolve the nuclear issue the government should carry out negotiations by binding the economic cooperation issue, the issue of separated families, the nuclear issue, and the issue of North Korea establishing diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan into one large negotiating table.

[Han] Before the emergence of the nuclear issue, we considered the possibility of a package settlement for an unprecedented improvement in South-North relations. However, since the nuclear issue is an issue between North Korea and the IAEA, I believe it will be difficult to reach a package settlement by making it into an internal one. Therefore, we have to recognize that the leverage we have is very weak. It does not mean that we will not take the initiative to resolve the nuclear issue. It simply means that this is a very difficult issue. Therefore, at this stage we will work to provide a breakthrough from the humanitarian level and expand the possibility of contacts in the cultural and social fields.

[Yi] There are rumors that currently South and North Korea are holding contacts and that South-North summit talks will be carried out within this year.

[Han] There are no intentional efforts to realize summit talks by the government. However, in his inaugural address, President Kim Yong-sam openly talked about this matter and he even talked about where to hold the summit talks. Now it is North Korea's turn to answer to this matter. I believe this issue will be gradually progressed with the improvement of South-North relations.

[Yi] It is known that North Korea's economic difficulty is very serious. How is economic cooperation progressing?

[Han] Even though North Korea is receiving international pressure in connection with its nuclear issue, it is also inviting our businessmen and actively carrying out contacts with our businesses in a third country. The government wants to carry out coexistence and coprosperity through economic cooperation with North Korea. It is a pity that practical economic cooperation cannot be carried out because the nuclear issue is now an international one. [passage omitted]

[Yi] North Korea is not dissolving its vigilance on the South side's intention to achieve reunification by absorbing North Korea. I received the impression that the government is giving weight to prepare for this if there is a possibility.

[Han] Through this opportunity I would like to make clear to the North Korean authorities that the Kim Yong-sam government neither has the intention, necessity, nor the capability to achieve reunification through absorption. We are also worried about achieving reunification through absorption. [passage omitted]

Government Likely To Propose South-North Talks Early June

SK1905052593 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
19 May 93 p 2

[Text] It has been learned that the government has tentatively decided to hold a meeting of cabinet ministers concerned with unification on 8 June to discuss holding South-North talks on North Korea's nuclear issue. Accordingly, the government's proposal to North Korea for holding inter-Korean talks will probably be delayed until early June.

Regarding the possibility of North Korea rejoining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], the government has hypothesized three choices North Korea could make: rejoining the NPT before 12 June, when its withdrawal from the NPT will be effective; rejoining the NPT after 12 June; or insisting on withdrawal from the NPT. In anticipation of each possible decision, the government is now drawing up multiple plans on the timing and method for holding South-North talks.

Regarding the timing of our side's proposal for talks with the North, a high-ranking government official said: "The government will decide when to propose South-North talks after watching the development of various situations for a while because there are still many variables, such as U.S.-North Korean high-level talks, in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue."

Seoul To Propose North-South Contact

SK2005014993 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0100 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] The ROK Government has decided to propose North-South dialogue to the North side perhaps as

soon as this afternoon [20 May] to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue and improve overall North-South relations.

The government confirmed this policy at the unification-related ministers' strategic meeting which was held this morning at the North-South Dialogue Secretariat. The government will propose, through liaison officials, that contacts between high-level representatives of the North and South be held in Panmunjom around next week.

A government high-level official said that if the contact between the North-South representatives takes place, Song Yong-tae, vice minister of Unification Board, and Yi Sung-kon, member of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security who has been appointed our side's chairman of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, will attend the contact.

Our side is reportedly ready to allow businessmen to visit North Korea if North Korea returns to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at the high-level contact. It was also reported that our side will propose the overall realization of North-South economic cooperation if North Korea accepts special inspections.

National Assembly Committee Adopts Nuclear Resolution

SK1705113693 Seoul YONHAP in English 1051 GMT
17 May 93

[Text] Seoul, May 17 (YONHAP)—The National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee on Monday adopted a resolution calling for the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issues.

The resolution, which was referred to the assembly plenary session upon its adoption, urged North Korea to respect what were suggested in a resolution recently adopted by the U.N. Security Council, and to agree to mutual nuclear inspections between South and North Korea.

"North Korea should agree to mutual inter-Korean inspections based on the joint denuclearization declaration and abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities if only to join in efforts to realize genuine denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," it said.

The resolution also urged the Seoul government to employ all available means either through international organizations or direct dialogue with North Korea to get the nuclear question resolved.

If North Korea refuses to return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to the end, it should be held responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom, the resolution said.

DPRK Nuclear Development Will Cause Proliferation in Asia

SK2005005593 Seoul YONHAP in English 0039 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Seoul, May 20 (YONHAP)—If North Korea goes nuclear, it will cause South Korea and Japan to do the same, Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu predicted Wednesday.

North Korea's defiance of international deterrence to its nuclear development would intensify pressure on the volatile communist regime, inviting a dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula, he said.

"We must deter North Korea's nuclear development in all circumstances," Han said in a lecture at Korea university. "If North Korea acquires atomic weapons, it raises the likelihood of Japan doing the same and gives stronger voice to demands within South Korea to do likewise."

Asked about inter-Korean economic cooperation, the foreign minister said it could not be separated from the process of solving the North Korean nuclear situation.

"Political and economic ties with North Korea do not have to be suspended until full resolution to the problem," said Han. "We cannot say now exactly when economic relations will resume, but it will reopen when the problem nears solution."

Han welcomed the fledgling Asia-Pacific regional cooperation such as the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), expecting them to contribute to economic cooperation and security dialogue.

"But these organizations are not the final versions. We need another body of multilateral cooperation," he said.

The foreign minister predicted a continued U.S. presence in the region for its economic and security interests but growing burdensharing for host countries to American servicemen.

"But the increase in the burden is a reflection of true partnership rather than a result of U.S. military scale-back," he said.

THAILAND

Bangkok Paper on Steps Toward Nuclear Power

BK2005053393 Bangkok THE NATION in English 20 May 93 p A6

[Editorial: "Debunking the myths about nuclear power"]

[Text] Thailand has moved a little bit closer towards having nuclear power. The House Energy agreed in principle that a nuclear power plant should be built and PM's Office Minister Dr Sawit Phothiwihok together with Egat Governor Sombun Maninawa announced on

TV that a three-year commercial feasibility study of the project would be undertaken.

Although many MPs are reportedly uneasy about the decision to go nuclear, a real political battle over the issue may not emerge until the final go-ahead is given and a site for the proposed plants is chosen. That may be three years from now, after a lot of money would already have been spent on laying the groundwork for running the reactors.

Both Sawit and committee spokesman Ekkapap Phonsue made a number of surprising claims—claims which definitely need to be examined if the record is to be set straight.

First of all, Ekkapap asserted that the Anan II cabinet approved the construction of nuclear power plants on Sept 12, 1992. This statement is highly misleading.

The Anan administration did approve Egat's long-term Rower production plan, which included plans to build several plants by the year 2006. But in an interview with the Nation, Anan asserted that such approval carried little real meaning in relation to the issue of whether to go nuclear. Anan noted that such plans must look far into the future and so typically include "everything under the sky".

"Nuclear is an option," Anan explained. "But in all my two years of administration, we [his cabinet] never once discussed this particular option."

Then there was Sawit's claim that nuclear power is clean. It's not. True, it doesn't flood forests and destroy rivers like hydro-electric dams; and, yes, nuclear reactors emit neither air pollution nor greenhouse gases like coal-fired power plants. But gas turbine and clean coal technology, along with promoting efficiency, can be considered to be greener alternatives for energy production.

Running nuclear reactors, and digging up the uranium used as fuel, yields highly dangerous radioactive waste. This by-product can last hundreds of thousands of years, and nobody has ever figured out how to store it in a manner that is entirely safe. Burial is considered the best method, but Thailand may not have the necessary geological features. Government authorities still hope to be able to export the waste, perhaps to Canada.

If this is allowed, it would undermine another argument made by Sawit: that nuclear power provides energy "security". Like hydro-power, nuclear power would be a home-grown energy source. But the technology would all come from abroad. And even if a domestic nuclear industry is developed over the next 30 years, we would still have to rely on foreigners for spare parts, fuel and perhaps a place to dump our waste.

It's also worth asking just how important the security issue is. As Thailand becomes ever more integrated with the world economy, we become ever more dependent on foreigners to supply raw materials and buy our finished goods.

The sector of our economy which is creating the huge demand for power is actually the export-oriented industry. We depend on foreigners purchasing our products, so why should we develop something as controversial as nuclear power just because we don't want to buy energy goods from abroad?

Cost is a big unknown. Nuclear power has become prohibitively expensive in the US. In France and Canada it is said to be much cheaper due to better management and planning, but this is probably the result of hidden government subsidies.

All these factors aside, in the end the debate over whether to go nuclear will probably revolve around the issue of safety. This issue is directly related to cost, since nuclear reactors can be made safer, but more expensive, through greater regulation. If nuclear power comes cheap, it may be at the expense of safety.

Ominously, the authorities are also probably making this calculation. With the memories of the hundreds killed by

the factory fire in Nakhon Pathom fresh in our minds, we don't need reminding about the government's record in such matters.

The decision on whether to go nuclear should be a result of reasoned debate, not scaremongering. But many people are whispering their fears: What would the Thai tendency toward corruption and poor regulation mean when it comes to building and monitoring something as dangerous as a nuclear power plant?

A key factor will be where the proposed plants and perhaps a waste disposal site will be located, since there is bound to be a great deal of local opposition. For the moment, everyone is keeping quiet on this issue, though there is general agreement it must be somewhere along the coast. Chances are it won't be too close to Bangkok.

The same can be said for any nuclear waste repository that has to be built. The (geologically stable) salt domes of the Northeast have been put forward as a possible site. But if Egat is so eager to go nuclear, perhaps it would be more fair to store the radioactive waste in Nonthaburi, at Egat's headquarters.

ARGENTINA

International Forum Held on Nuclear Energy, Weapons

PY1905161293

[Editorial Report] Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish on 18 May publishes on page 1 of section 3 an 800-word article by Eduardo Calvo Sans on an open forum organized by the Integration Foundation, and presided over by Raul Granillo Ocampo, on the subject "Nuclear Energy—Myth and Reality."

Granillo says that "nuclear energy appeared 50 years ago as the answer to a need," adding that nuclear energy "is neither entirely bad nor entirely good."

The article says that "in the past few years Argentina and Brazil have agreed on mutual controls, to guarantee to the world that they would not manufacture nuclear weapons," adding that the two countries possess the know-how to enrich uranium. The article notes that Argentina and Brazil had accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls.

Dan Beninson, who represented Argentina's National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA), noted that the Brazilian Congress has yet to ratify the agreements involving the IAEA. Beninson also elaborated on the problems involved in the disposal of nuclear waste.

Carlos Feu Alvin, of the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control Agency (ABACC), said that "the two countries want IAEA safeguards" but "without affecting technological secrets." Carlos Feu said that "Argentina and Brazil had proposed amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty" and are now "ready to ratify it together with Chile."

Argentine nuclear expert Luis Masperi said that only five countries in the world "had assumed the right to have the bomb while forbidding others from having it,"

adding that these countries "do not submit their uranium enrichment installations to IAEA safeguards."

Foreign Ministry representative Rogelio Pflirter said "the countries possessing nuclear weapons did not use them after World War II, and now, at the end of the Cold War, they are working on plans to progressively eliminate them." Pflirter added that Argentina "found a ceiling in the country's development" during the period it implemented "unclear nuclear policies," adding that "current open policies have permitted concluding nuclear energy agreements with the United States, Canada, France, and Japan."

Tania Malheiros, commentator for the Brazilian newspapers O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO and O GLOBO, was cited as saying that she "knows military officers who want to have the bomb, and had been threatened and had her telephone tapped because of her work" on the book entitled "Brazil—The Hidden Bomb."

BRAZIL

Figures on Angra-1 Nuclear Waste Storage 'Deceptive'

PY1805153493 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese
17 May 93 p 8

[From the "Swann" social column]

[Text] Reports on the nuclear waste stored at the Angra-1 nuclear electric power plant have been deceptive.

There are actually 50 metric tons of waste instead of the 26 metric tons which have so far been officially reported.

Last Saturday Angra-1 director Pedro Figueiredo reported the mistakes to deputies who were visiting the plant.

The active life of the waste—Cesium-137, xenon, uranium, and plutonium—is some 30,000 years.

INDIA

U.S.-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship Needs Study

93WP0158A *Madras THE HINDU in English*
18 Mar 93 p 9

[Article by C. Raja Mohan]

[Text] Washington—There is a growing sentiment in Washington that the nuclear sanctions that the U.S. had imposed against Pakistan since October 1990 may have outlived their utility. This new perception may have begun to force a reevaluation of the American non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan.

India is bound to be dragged into the reordering of U.S.-Pak nuclear relations, and New Delhi needs to carefully review its own options as Washington begins to lay the ground for a repeal of the Pressler Amendment.

Since the late 1970s, Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons had played an important role in the see-saw strategic relationship between Washington and Islamabad. Further, much of the American law on non-proliferation was triggered by the massive clandestine effort of Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons.

These laws were invoked whenever the strategic stakes of the United States in Pakistan were low. In April 1979, the Carter Administration invoked the Symington Amendment to cut off aid to Pakistan. The successive U.S. Administrations waived these laws whenever its relationship with Pakistan was considered useful.

Seeking a strategic consensus with Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States decided to drop the application of non-proliferation law against Islamabad. The Reagan Administration downplayed the importance of non-proliferation and even turned a blind eye to Pakistani proliferation. Alongside, it injected billions of dollars of economic and military assistance into Pakistan.

With the winding down of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the renewed American concerns on non-proliferation, the nuclear factor surfaced again to bring in fresh tension to U.S.-Pak relations.

By then Pakistan had already acquired nuclear weapons capability, making the belated American concerns about nuclear proliferation difficult to implement. Then came the death of General Zia ul Haq in 1988 and the election of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister, which gave the United States an opportunity to work out a deal with Islamabad.

Despite having irrefutable proof of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability, the Bush Administration certified, almost blindly, in 1989 that Islamabad does not possess a nuclear device, facilitating the continued disbursement of American aid to Pakistan. On Pakistan's side, the then Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto had reportedly

agreed to freeze her country's nuclear programme. Just as easily as the many previous nuclear restraint commitments of Islamabad, this too was violated in 1990. There is enough evidence now to suggest that the Pakistani military, which also runs the country's nuclear weapon programme, then led by Gen. Aslam Beg, broke this commitment.

Intelligence leaks in Washington now indicate that by using the so-called spring 1990 crisis over Kashmir, Pakistan apparently renewed the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium. There are also unconfirmed American reports that the Pakistani military was getting the nuclear weapons ready for use against India.

This strategic defiance by Pakistan resulted in the inability of the Bush Administration to certify that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons and the consequent cut-off of the American aid to Islamabad. Since then Pakistan has complained bitterly about the aid cut-off even as it sought to find a new *modus vivendi* with the United States.

By early 1992, the United States and Pakistan had begun to move towards a new nuclear understanding. During his visit to Washington in February 1992, the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Sharyar Khan, went public with the declaration that Pakistan had the capability to assemble at least one nuclear weapon. He, Mr. Khan said, was coming clean to remove the credibility gap generated by the past nuclear statements of his country's government.

It had also been reported then in the American media that Islamabad had agreed to freeze the Pakistani nuclear programme once again and not to make any more cores of nuclear weapons. It, however, refused to dismantle the existing nuclear weapons without obtaining a parallel commitment from India.

While this unilateral Pakistani nuclear restraint is widely acknowledged in Washington, it is not clear how this commitment is being verified. In any event, by March 1992, the Bush Administration had begun to argue for a reinterpretation of the Pressler Amendment, suggesting that commercial sales of military equipment were not prohibited by the Pressler restrictions.

Underlying the new legal justifications for diluting the Pressler restrictions was the political sense that continued punitive action on the nuclear issue could push Pakistan into the lap of fundamentalists at home and radical Islamic nations abroad. Some American analysts have also argued that the U.S. aid cut-off gave India little incentive to respond to the Pakistani proposals on regional or bilateral non-proliferation regimes.

An American sense that it would be prudent to maintain a viable political relationship with Pakistan, now seen as a moderate Islamic country that needs to be buttressed against Islamic fundamentalism, may be beginning to gain ground in Washington.

A repeal of the Pressler Amendment could also better position Washington to play a significant role in the internal Pakistani struggle over the Eighth Amendment to Pakistan's constitution, that has concentrated excessive powers in the hands of the President Mr. Ghulam Isaq Khan. The President's term comes to an end later this year, and the Constitutional tussle over the Eighth Amendment may have long-term implications for the evolution of the Pakistani polity.

Whatever the American calculations be on the Pressler Amendment and the internal politics of Pakistan, New Delhi needs to fully grasp the emerging nuclear nuances in the U.S.-Pak relationship. It should be prepared for a formal repeal of the Pressler Amendment and the renewal of the U.S. aid to Pakistan.

India needs to signal Washington that it will not accept any new attempts to rope India into what is essentially a U.S.-Pak problem. The U.S. is free to interpret its own laws; and there is little justification to draw India into this. Over the last couple of years, Pakistani brains have been working hard to get the U.S. Congress [to] extend the Pressler Amendment to India. This would be tried again this year.

The main conclusion for India should be that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are now a reality and that the United States is not in a position to rob Pakistan of its existing nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of both India and Pakistan to acknowledge and accept each other's nuclear capability and work for a bilateral nuclear restraint regime that would reduce the danger of war in the subcontinent.

U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation Discussed

BK1305132593 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 13 May 93

[Commentary by ASSAM EXPRESS Correspondent Dev Prakash]

[Text] Though late than never, the U.S. administration has realized that it must take into account not only Indian domestic political concerns but also regional security threat perceptions created by Pakistan, China and Central Asian nations. This is what India had been pleading against the Pakistani proposal, cleverly made for keeping West Asia free from nuclear arms. India had been demanding a universal approach for nuclear proliferation regime. A report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 5 May has asked the Clinton administration not to pursue the nonproliferation issue on the basis of external pressures. Referring to South Asia, the document points out that India and Pakistan have advanced programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems.

The reality of the situation is that India has never developed nuclear technology to manufacture weapons of mass destruction despite pressures from both Pakistan and China. Because of regional tensions between India

and Pakistan caused by Pakistan's proxy war policy, India had to develop ballistic missile delivery system. Initially, India's missile program was driven by security concerns about China. But Pakistan's nuclear programs have now added to these concerns. In fact, Pakistan's program is aided by China, which adds another security concern.

The report says that China has been assisting Pakistan's missile program and nuclear activities. In 1991, USA had imposed sanctions on both Pakistan and China following transfer of missile technology. Though, subsequently, the sanctions were waived on assurance from Beijing that it would observe the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. It also promised to adhere to NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] in 1992. But it continues to help Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and missile export policy.

Since America wants to remain superpower and wants to ensure that in future, both distant and near, no other country poses any danger to America's security, it does not want any other country, especially from the Third World, to acquire the nuclear or missile technology. In order to pursue this rather ambitious agenda, the U.S. has emphasized nonproliferation as a major issue in its relationship with both India and Pakistan. In addition, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Japan, which, the report points out, are some of the major aid donors for India and Pakistan, have also been persuaded to undertake bilateral discussions on nonproliferation and regional security issues with India and Pakistan.

Such combined pressure tactics are intended to underscore to India and Pakistan that nonproliferation is a global, not just a U.S. concern. Secondly, the fact that USA gives due respect to the domestic political concerns of India on the signing of the NPT by admitting that any retreat by government from the principle that India had the moral and strategic right to nuclear weapons as long as others continue to possess them could bring down the government.

The convergence of India-U.S. perceptions becomes even more clear by the sympathetic view the president has taken on India's concerns about the existence of real or potential dangers of extended region. The USA has obviously not altered its Cold War definition of South Asia for the benefit of India. It appears to have been mould more to continuing transfer of missile-related technology from China to Pakistan, including their shipment of Chinese M-11 missile parts to Islamabad. [sentence as heard] Moreover, Pakistan's terrorist links have become more embarrassingly patent and the trail for the World Trade Center and bombings in Bombay also goes toward that country.

The report is yet deficient in certain respects from Indian point of view. It sets off with the oft-repeated Pakistani view that India had not fully accepted its legitimacy as a separate independent nation state. The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent sovereign state in 1971

proves that India has no intention of undoing the partition. On the other hand, it is Pakistan which still talks about the unfinished business of partition. The report fails to take note of the fact that, excepting the eight ICBM's, the rest of Chinese nuclear force cannot reach the U.S. and the Chinese force can pose a threat only to South and Southeast Asia. It is an axiomatic principle in strategy that it is not the current intention of a country but its potential which needs to be taken into account.

Concern Over Proliferation Shared With Japan

93WP0157A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
19 Mar 93 p 9

[Article by K. K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, March 18—A sharing of concerns is discernible in the perceptions of India and Japan on nuclear non-proliferation [NPT], indeed on most geo-strategic issues in the Asian context. This and not the divergence on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty stood out of the quiet bilateral official-level dialogue held last week-end, that remained unpublished.

A team from Tokyo led by its Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament, Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki was here for talks with Indian officials, in keeping with the decision taken by the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, and his Japanese counterpart, Mr. Kiichi Miyazawa, in June last year. The discussions of the two Prime Ministers in Tokyo had centered on the NPT, with each side re-stating its known position. Earlier, Japan even contemplated linking its aid with India's accession to the treaty. That, certainly, was not the tenor of the latest round. The reason—their shared concern over the China factor.

The discussions of the officials, though preliminary, threw up some significant trends. They were agreed that (1) the solution to the non-proliferation problem need not be confined to the old stereotype and that new arrangements and ideas could be explored; (2) the need of the hour was a bigger package, covering not only India and Pakistan, but China as well; and (3) equal importance be attached to the strategic concerns of the countries intended to be covered by the package and their security assured.

This is an important departure from the past thinking which either favoured an NPT-based solution or a five-power conference to work out plans for a nuclear-free South Asia. The second proposal did not envisage a sharing of obligations by the five—for while India and Pakistan were to be required to accept nuclear restraints, no such obligation was to be cast on the other three, the U.S., Russia and China.

Japan, an ardent votary: Japan was among the late signatories to the NPT but partly because of the zeal of a new convert and partly because of the U.S. exhortation for an active role for ensuring compliance with the NPT in Asia, it became an ardent votary of its extension, as

was evident from the persuasive pressure on India. It will be a different story now. The changed strategic environment in Asia has made Japan aware of the inadequacies, even anomalies, of the NPT. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China had been a major recipient of Moscow's nuclear technology and equipment. The treaty does not bar the transfer of nuclear weapon technology from one "have" to another but any such supply to a "have-not" is not permissible. Tokyo, thus, finds the NPT aiding the shift in the power-balance in Asia to its disadvantage.

This brings India and Japan close to each other on matters connected with the treaty, on which Tokyo had set its heart not long ago. India, all these years, had objected to the NPT because of its discriminating provisions against the non-nuclear powers. Because of the changed Asian context, Japan appears to have veered to this view. Whether the two countries follow the logical course of joining in the demand for a modification of the NPT is not yet clear.

New Delhi had been resisting Western pressures for a regional nuclear package for South Asia, confined to India and Pakistan, for two reasons: (1) that the nuclear weapons, because of their global reach, did not admit of regional solutions and (2) that China was a major factor in India's security perceptions and, therefore, any arrangement that does not take it into account, will be regarded inadequate. The China factor has now loomed larger over the Asian nuclear horizon—and Japan finds it hard to ignore it.

The Japanese team visited Pakistan last month and, according to the foreign office spokesman in Islamabad, gave some new formulations to its hosts. The details, however, were not made public. As regards the NPT, Pakistan repeated the known view—that it would sign the treaty only if India does. Pakistan had been making light of New Delhi's plea on China. Mr. Donowaki could not but have mentioned the China factor to Pakistan but there is nothing to suggest a change in Islamabad's perceptions based on its obsession with India.

Lists of Nuclear Facilities Exchanged With Pakistan

93WP0156A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
19 Mar 93 p 8

[Excerpt] New Delhi, March 18—India has exchanged lists of nuclear installations and facilities with Pakistan in January 1992 and again in January this year as per the provisions of the agreement on the prohibition of attack against nuclear installations and facilities between the two countries signed in 1988, the Rajya Sabha was told today.

The lists contain the names of nuclear installations and facilities together with their longitudes and latitudes, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's office, Mr. Bhuvnesh Chaturvedi, told Mr. S.D. Singh in a written reply.

The Government plans to raise the power level of the fast breeder test reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam near Madras soon to eight MW.

The reactor will be operated at this power level for about two months and, after that, it is planned to raise the reactor power further to 12 MW and to operate at that level for about one year, Mr. Chaturvedi told Mr. S. Madhavan in another written reply.

The rated capacity of the reactor is about 40 MW and this is expected to be progressively achieved by 1994 end, he added. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Understanding With Pakistan Urged

93WP0152A Madras THE HINDU in English
1 Apr 93 p 8

[Article by C. Raja Mohan: "South Asia's Nuclear Spring"]

[Text] Predictably, the reaction from Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad has been dismissive of the assertion by the noted American journalist, Mr. Seymour Hersh, that India and Pakistan were on the brink of a nuclear war in the spring of 1990. Nevertheless, the defence and foreign policy decision-makers in New Delhi must carefully weigh the new information brought to light by Mr. Hersh in his article in the latest issue of the NEW YORKER magazine.

An honest Indian internal assessment and more informed public discussion of the train of events of the first half of 1990, when the Indo-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir were real, are necessary for achieving long-term military and nuclear stability between India and Pakistan. This is a far more important task than passing a judgment on the accuracy of the Hersh story.

Like all such journalistic accounts, the Hersh version of the nuclear dimension of the Kashmir crisis is by no means authoritative. Mr. Hersh's claims are based on formal interviews with two of the leading American officials involved in the episode. One of them is Mr. Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser in the Bush administration, who led a hurried mission to New Delhi and Islamabad in May 1990 to defuse the crisis. The other is Mr. Richard Kerr, who as the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency coordinated the intelligence reporting in Washington during May 1990.

Clearly many conclusions and interpretations of the Hersh report are questionable. His judgments on the Indian motivations and actions during the crisis are obviously not well informed. Some of his assertions are indeed fantastic. Referring to the Indian Brass Tacks exercise during 1986-87, he suggests that Gen. Sunderji had decided to "integrate India's special weapons, including tactical nuclear bombs, into the day-to-day field manoeuvres of the troops!" It is obvious that Mr.

Hersh is yet to get his basic information on India's nuclear programme, the Brass Tacks exercise, and the Indian motivations in 1990 right.

But the central thesis of Mr. Hersh is not really about India; it is about Pakistan and the United States. It is that Pakistan was ready to use nuclear weapons against India and that the United States had helped Pakistan get the nuclear weapons. He has shed some new light on the nature of Pakistan's nuclear manoeuvres during the crisis, and on the internal struggle within the Reagan and Bush administrations in responding to the emerging Pakistani nuclear capability in the 1980s.

Mr. Hersh's assertion on Pakistan's readiness to use nuclear weapons during the Kashmir crisis is based on four important bits of information that he has apparently obtained from the U.S. intelligence sources that were closely monitoring the situation on the ground.

"In the early spring of 1990," according to Mr. Hersh, "Washington had gathered intelligence that was described as hundred per cent reliable," probably an intercept by the U.S. National Security Agency, with the "ominous news that Gen. Beg had authorised the technicians at Kahuta to put together nuclear weapons." The essence of the information was that if India begins a ground invasion of Pakistan, Gen. Beg would be ready to use nuclear weapons to "take out Delhi."

"Alerted by the intelligence, Washington augmented the satellite coverage and electronic eavesdropping of the subcontinent." Some time in May, according to Mr. Hersh, "an orbiting American satellite relayed photographs of what some officials believed was the evacuation of thousands of workers from Kahuta," a major centre of Pakistan's nuclear weapon activity. Some American intelligence analysts assumed that the evacuation of Kahuta was in Pakistan's anticipation of Indian nuclear retaliation to Islamabad's nuclear first strike.

Also in May, the U.S. spotted the nuclear weapon storage facility of Pakistan in the mountains of Baluchistan. The American intelligence also learned that Mr. A.Q. Khan, the architect of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, visited the site during the period. It was argued in Washington that if Pakistan expected Indian nuclear retaliation, it would surely try to disperse its nuclear arsenal away from the storage site in Baluchistan. As expected American satellite and other intelligence produced signs of a truck convoy moving from the storage site to a nearby Air Force base. The elaborate security drills in moving the precious nuclear cargo were monitored with ease in Washington.

And finally, Mr. Hersh recounts the frightening sight of a full nuclear alert by Pakistan. He cites an intelligence analyst as saying, "They had F-16s prepositioned and armed for delivery—on full alert, with pilots in the aircraft. I believed they were ready to launch on command and that that message had been clearly conveyed to the Indians."

According to Mr. Hersh, these developments convinced the United States that without external intervention the Indo-Pakistan tensions could escalate into a war that could turn nuclear. The result was the Gates mission that sought to defuse the tensions.

Bits and pieces of intelligence information on the nuclear mobilisation by Pakistan had appeared earlier in the American media since the Gates mission took place. The NBC report on Pakistan's nuclear weapons broadcast last December had suggested that the Pakistani military was all set for the launch of nuclear weapons in the spring of 1990. The CIA in a public Congressional briefing last February had indicated that under certain scenarios the nuclear escalation of the 1990 Indo-Pakistan conflict was considered likely. What Mr. Hersh has done now is to present some of this intelligence assessment in a more detailed and coherent form.

There are clearly difficulties for India in making judgments on partial and selective leaks of intelligence information that occur in Washington. One judgment, however, seems unavoidable. For whatever reasons, justified or unjustified, the Pakistan military did see some utility in unsheathing the nuclear sword during the crisis of 1990. It is not clear whether Pakistan's nuclear manoeuvre was out of genuine or manufactured fears of a presumed Indian intent to attack Pakistan, or part of an aggressive game of brinkmanship and nuclear blackmail over Kashmir. It is also not inconceivable that the nuclear game of 1990 may have had a lot to do with the internal power struggle in Pakistan itself.

Whatever the motivations for the nuclear sabrerattling of Pakistan during the spring 1990 crisis, there are some long-term implications that New Delhi must address itself to. It no longer makes sense for India and Pakistan to pretend that they are non-nuclear. Nuclear weapons are now a reality on the Indian subcontinent. The faster India and Pakistan learn the difficult art of living in a nuclear neighbourhood, the better it is for the people of the Indian subcontinent.

The recent sharp deterioration of the relationship between India and Pakistan suggests that the two nations are a long way from productive cooperation. The relations will remain tense, crisis prone, with the inherent possibility of escalation into a conflict. If the relations are likely to remain adversarial, it is all the more important for New Delhi and Islamabad to consciously seek to manage a nuclear peace in the subcontinent.

If Pakistan drops its insistence on a five-power conference to denuclearise the subcontinent, India could move towards a direct bilateral nuclear negotiation with Pakistan. Such a move would reduce the external non-proliferation pressure while opening the door for a realistic Indo-Pakistani dialogue on nuclear restraint and war-avoidance.

The consequences of another war would be utterly ruinous for India and Pakistan. Notwithstanding the current Indo-Pakistan differences over Kashmir and a

whole range of other issues, New Delhi and Islamabad must enter into an unconditional bilateral dialogue on nuclear restraint. A negotiated regime of nuclear and military restraint is too important to be linked to progress on any other issue.

IRAN

Denial of Rabin Comments on Nuclear Arms

*LD1505064793 Tehran IRNA in English
0556 GMT 15 May 93*

[Text] Athens, May 15, IRNA—The Iranian Embassy here Friday rejected accusations by the head of the Zionist regime made on a Greek Television on Iran's nuclear capability as "false and baseless". In a press release issued Thursday in response to comments made by Yitzhaq Rabin in an interview with Greek state-run Television ET-1 last month, the embassy reiterated that Tehran had no plans to make nuclear bombs.

In the TV-interview the head of the Zionist regime alleged that Iran was planning to make nuclear weapons and that it was a threat to the region. The release underlined that Tehran not only has no plan to reach nuclear weapon capability, but is one of the advocates of the convention for the destruction of chemical weapons, has signed the non-proliferation treaty and supports the policy of elimination and destruction of all weapons of mass destruction. "In contrast, the occupying regime of Palestine has had its army equipped with nuclear weapons for well over the last decade, and with its refusal to join the treaty banning nuclear weapons, does not permit the experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit its nuclear facilities".

"Stockpiling nuclear weapons in this occupied land will not only create various threats against the countries of the region, but directly endanger the security of the region of the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe," the press release said.

"The so-called Israeli regime has been established through killings, creation of terror, expulsion and threats against the original residents of Palestine and has continued this policy of aggression during the past 40 years since its establishment".

It stressed that Iran is the only country in the region which has not any territorial claim against any of its neighbours and according to its Constitution any kind of intervention in the affairs of other countries is rejected.

"Iran has consistently supported the strengthening of peace and stability in the region of the Middle East and believes that continuation of occupation of the Palestine and Arab lands is the only issue of insecurity, instability and threat against peace in the region," it said.

PAKISTAN

Russia Said To Offer Nuclear Plant

93WP0146A Lahore THE NATION in English
19 Apr 93 p 14

[Text] Islamabad (PPI)—The Russian Federation has offered full cooperation for development of Pakistan's energy resources and expressed willingness for supply of conventional and nuclear power plants to help Pakistan meet its growing requirements in energy sector.

Highly placed sources told PPI here on Thursday that a Russian delegation now in Pakistan is holding talks on the subject at various levels.

The sources termed Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's talks with Pakistan leadership on all issues including the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia as very meaningful and constructive and said Russia fully supports Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's proposal of five nations consultations for achieving nuclear non-proliferation regime in South Asia.

The sources said that the Government of Pakistan has decided to further upgrade its relations with Russia in all fields of life adding that Russian leadership is also thinking in the same direction.

Official Denies M-11 Missile Purchases

HK2105093593 Hong Kong AFP in English
0918 GMT 21 May 93

[Text] Beijing, May 21 (AFP)—A senior Pakistani official denied Thursday [day as received] that Islamabad has received M-11 missiles from China, calling reports of such transfers speculative and "motivated."

"I categorically deny that Pakistan has taken M-11 missiles," Akram Zaki, secretary general of the country's foreign ministry, told reporters here.

"I can tell you Pakistan has not acquired them."

He declined to say if Pakistan was interested in acquiring M-11s or if his government considered the ballistic missiles to be controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

"Pakistan and China have a long-standing friendship and we have a relationship which also extends to the field of defense since 1963, but once China made commitments to honor the MTCR limit, China has strictly adhered to those commitments," Zaki said.

Press reports citing U.S. intelligence sources have said spy satellites spotted two dozen Chinese M-11 missiles being delivered to Pakistan.

"These are speculative stories and motivated allegations," said Zaki, a one-time Pakistani ambassador to China.

The M-11 surface-to-surface missiles are more accurate and mobile and fire more rapidly than the Scuds used by Iraq during the Gulf War, and China has denied selling them to Pakistan.

The two Asian countries have close relations in part because of shared suspicions and tensions with India.

Zaki had harsh words for India during his address to the Foreign Correspondents Club here, accusing New Delhi of carrying out a "policy of suppression and a scorched-earth policy" in Kashmir against what he called "the spontaneous, indigenous freedom movement."

"There has been an ever-intensifying cycle of more suppression and more revolt and this has increased tensions in our area," he said, adding that India was refusing to settle the issue through negotiations.

The diplomat also denied reports that terrorists based in Pakistan could be behind the deadly bombings earlier this year in Bombay and at New York's World Trade Center.

Zaki is in Beijing to take part in annual consultations between the Pakistani and Chinese foreign ministries.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Japanese Scientist Says Soviets May Have Tested Cobalt Bombs

OW2005152893 Tokyo KYODO in English
1213 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Tokyo, May 20 KYODO—Contaminated soil from areas near the largest nuclear test site in the former Soviet Union suggests that radioactive cobalt bombs were being tested, a researcher at Nihon University said Thursday [20 May].

Kunikazu Noguchi, who works at the university's radio isotope research center, said his investigations show unusually high densities of cobalt 60 from the site in the eastern part of Kazakhstan. He will announce further details at an academic conference on health and physics in Fukuoka on Friday.

Cobalt 60 has a half-life of only five years, but Noguchi said the high densities found in the samples raise the possibility that the Soviet Union was using the test site at Semipalatinsk to test cobalt bombs designed to spread radioactive contamination.

The soil samples, taken from around an artificial lake near the test site, were supplied by the Japan Eurasia Society whose members visited the region last September to survey nuclear contamination.

Noguchi used a gamma ray spectrometer to show that radionuclide cobalt 60 was present in densities of up to 72,500 becquerels per kilogram of soil.

Cobalt 60 is a heavy radioactive isotope of cobalt of the mass number 60 commonly produced in nuclear reactors and used in radiotherapy. A becquerel is a standard international measurement used to specify the activity of radioactive particles.

Noguchi said that 30 years after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, cobalt 60 radioactivity densities at the epicenter of the blast measured four becquerels per kilogram.

Measurements at Semipalatinsk were 18,000 times this density.

The researcher also compared the current level of radioactivity or europium whose radionuclide has a different half-life to calculate that the tests could have been conducted about 30 years ago.

Europium is a metallic element found in the rare-earth group.

Noguchi said his findings at first suggested two possible results.

One was that the Soviet Union tested cobalt bombs, which are designed not only to cause damage but also to cause radioactive contamination.

The other was that at the same time as carrying out its nuclear tests, the cobalt and europium in the soil absorbed a large number of neutrons to become radioactive.

But Noguchi said that judging by the extremely high levels of radioactivity in the soil, it is likely the tests involved cobalt bombs.

RUSSIA

Commentary on U.S. Moves To Resume Nuclear Testing

LD1705213993 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2010 GMT 17 May 93

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] Top administration officials met in Washington on Friday to draw up recommendations for President Clinton in respect to the moratorium on nuclear testing that expires on 1st July. Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov.

The question is one of implementing the congressional law endorsed by President Bush last October. It provides for a moratorium on nuclear tests until 1st July 1993, to be followed by as many as 15 nuclear tests until 30th September 1996. At the same time, the White House is instructed to submit to Congress a schedule of talks with Russia on ending nuclear explosions and a plan for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. And finally, the law provides for no U.S. testing after 30th September 1996 provided no other state holds them beyond that date.

It would seem not only did later events reaffirm how important the U.S. law was, but also raised a number of questions relating to the need for more vigorous actions to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In retrospect, Russia and the United States signed the START II agreement to slash each other's nuclear weapons by two thirds while relations between Moscow and Washington were put on (the) footing of those between two good neighbors and partners. They had also agreed to consult other nuclear states about the need for multilateral talks on a comprehensive test ban.

Against this backdrop, reports from Washington spoke of a number of U.S. politicians discussing various options which are totally out of line with the spirit of the times. Although the White House declined to comment on Friday's meeting of top administration officials working out recommendations for the U.S. President, correspondents say not only was the question of lifting the test ban after 1st July discussed but also the possibility of continuing one kilotonne tests beyond 1996. The likelihood of resuming tests had been mooted in the U.S. press even before the Friday meeting, causing leading U.S. Congressmen, including the Senate

majority leader George Mitchell, to send a letter of protest to Mr. Clinton over the idea of continued testing beyond 1996.

Clearly, the problem of a comprehensive test ban will be complicated if the U.S. resumes nuclear explosions after 1st July, let alone continues them until 1996. Both Moscow and Paris have repeatedly warned they will have to review their own moratoriums if the United States goes ahead with the resumption of tests. It isn't hard to conceive how fatal the U.S. decision can be to the international effort to try and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, which is an overriding priority for the international community at present.

Newscast Quotes U.S. Arms Expert on Competition

LD1405212793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 14 May 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The interests of the United States and Russia will clash on arms markets in third countries in the near future, and this may become an alarming factor in relations between these two countries. This was stated at a briefing in Moscow by Henri Pierre, a U.S. expert on matters relating to the arms trade from the Carnegie Foundation. However, according to the expert, this problem can be settled. The market will remain free to Russia in those countries where the United States does not sell its arms, that is Iran, China, and North Korea.

Cooperation With Czech Republic To Halt Radioactive Materials Smuggling

LD1705125693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1150 GMT 17 May 93

[By CRIMEPRESS correspondent Sergey Oleynik for TASS]

[Text] Moscow, 17 May—The Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service and the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs will cooperate in attempting to halt the smuggling of radioactive materials from former Soviet Union republics into Europe. This agreement was reached when Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, visited Prague 12-15 May.

"The Czech Republic, which is in the center of Europe, has become one of the channels of illegal movements of nuclear fuel, raw materials, and of certain elements crucial for building weapons of mass destruction, Yevgeniy Primakov's press secretary, Tatyana Samolis, stated, and it is no secret that certain former Soviet Union republics may be a source—even though hypothetically—of leakage of these raw materials and elements. Therefore, information exchange and joint actions by the Russian Federation and the Czech

Republic in the area of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction are not only useful, but also necessary."

Last year in Austria—home of the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency—where there is more dealing in illegal buying and selling of nuclear materials than in any other country, there were at least two arrests of Czechoslovak citizens in possession of radioactive goods. In one case, experts reached a verifiable conclusion that illegally smuggled uranium 235 had been produced in a Soviet-built reactor.

Moscow Chemical Weapons Conference Reported

More Than 20 Countries Represented

LD1905123793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 19 May 93

[Video report by Mikhail Aleksandridi, Yuriy Kovalenko; from the Novosti newscast]

[text] Representatives of more than 20 countries who have gathered in Moscow to attend the International Conference on Chemical Disarmament will take three days to discuss various aspects of this problem. It is an acute problem for Russia, not only because 40,000 tonnes of poisonous substances are on its territory, but also because more than a half of all disarmament expenditure will be required to destroy chemical weapons. This is noted in a message of greeting, sent by Boris Yeltsin to the participants in the conference. It is Yeltsin's view that the implementation of the tasks provided for in the Paris convention banning chemical weapons is possible only under a close and open international cooperation. Only such cooperation is capable of stopping the vicious circle of mankind stockpiling arsenals with which to kill itself. The Moscow Conference is an attempt to provide an answer to the question of how this is to be done. [video shows conference participants]

Official Discusses Legislation

LD2105020593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1855 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS—"The success of a comprehensive programme for stage-by-stage elimination of chemical weapons in Russia will much depend on efficient legislation, which is yet being worked out," Vladislav Malyshev, secretary of the organizing committee of the international conference on chemical disarmament, told ITAR-TASS at the President Hotel on Thursday.

In his opinion, Russia will have to work out mechanisms for implementation of laws. It is not the government, but local authorities that should put forward an initiative to place facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons in their regions, Malyshev said. He believes that the

campaign will begin when applications to mount these facilities are submitted by local authorities to the committee for problems of conversion of chemical and biological weapons under the Russian president, which means that the struggle to win the public opinion will begin.

Malyshev said that at today's session the attention of Russian scientists focused on the experience of their American colleagues to develop contacts and information exchange with public organisations and with the "green" movement, in particular.

On Friday, the participants in the conference will discuss problems of destroying poisonous substances and taking them under control, and medical and ecological aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons.

An address is expected to be made at the end of the conference to leaders and public figures of states which signed a convention on banning the development, production, stockpiling and the use of chemical weapons and their elimination.

Moscow Calls for Extension of Nuclear Test Ban

*LD1805120893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1124 GMT 18 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents]

[Text] Moscow May 18 TASS—Russia said it is ready to extend its nuclear test ban and called on world nuclear powers to follow suit.

"Russia would like to prolong the moratorium on nuclear tests and make it permanent. Our position will greatly depend on positions of other nuclear states", Foreign Ministry spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy told reporters on Tuesday.

"We hope that the moratorium on nuclear tests which was announced in Paris and then in Washington will be prolonged and we do not forget that in Vancouver, during the Yeltsin-Clinton summit, the sides agreed to begin consultations regarding a solution of the problem of banning nuclear tests on a wide international basis", he added.

BELARUS

Nuclear Materials Reportedly Smuggled to Middle East

*MK2105084093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No. 21, 23 May 93 (Signed to Press
18 May) p A5*

[Larisa Sayenko report under the "Smuggling" rubric: "Nuclear Rivers—Middle East Riverbanks"]

[Excerpts] Vasily Sholodonov, general prosecutor of the Republic of Belarus, has sent a memo to Prime Minister

Vyacheslav Kebich urging customs controls on the Western border to be toughened.

This was prompted by an investigation conducted by the prosecutor's office into the case of smuggled uranium from the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant in Udmurtia, which produces uranium for nuclear reactors. The smuggled consignment of uranium was seized at the Brest checkpoint. Mikhail Gordyko, senior investigator at the general prosecutor's office, found out during the initial investigation that there was an entire international syndicate comprising Russia, Belarus, the Baltic states, and Poland, which handles transshipments of uranium-238 in metallic form. One identified group alone stole nearly 100 kg of this raw material from the plant. The flow of smuggled radioactive materials and components required for the creation of nuclear weapons, such as hafnium and zirconium, has visibly increased recently. The customs' technical capabilities do not allow them to close the border for these goods. Belarus is not the only state whose strategic interests are affected by the smuggling.

The German Embassy made known in a verbal note that Europe is being inundated with hazardous radioactive materials that often pose a safety risk due to improper handling. [passage omitted]

Klaus Toepfer, German minister for environment, nature conservation, and security of nuclear reactors, said in the above note that "the radioactive materials stolen and smuggled into Germany and other West European countries cannot be profitably sold, contrary to what the mass media often report nowadays." [passage omitted]

This is not quite so. Germany, and particularly Poland, are the transshipment points for nuclear parts transported to the Middle East. One kilogram of uranium costs approximately \$250,000 on the "black market." The price is undoubtedly set by the market and proves that these goods are in demand. Mikhail Gordyko reckons that the leak of strategically important raw materials is made worse by the connivance of the Russian special services. The illegal route reflects the political ambitions of certain influential forces interested in continuing tensions in the Middle East. Small wonder that it is the Israeli intelligence service Mosad that appears concerned most over the widening flow of nuclear smuggling.

LATVIA

IAEA Experts Arrive To Inspect Salaspils Nuclear Reactor

*WS2005123493 Tallinn BNS in English
1936 GMT 18 May 93*

[Text] Riga, May 18, BNS—The International Atomic Energy Agency Experts arrived in Latvia this week to

examine the Salaspils nuclear reactor and draft a non-proliferation treaty, said Andrejs Salmins, a radiation expert at the Environment Protection Committee.

Atomic energy experts are scheduled to meet with officials from the Latvian foreign relations ministry May 18 and discuss procedural issues for drafting the non-proliferation treaty. Latvia joined the IAEA last year. According to agency regulations, each member is obliged to sign the treaty within 18 months.

The experts will visit the Salaspils nuclear reactor May 18 and examine the possibilities of installing control equipment there.

The guests will hold a press conference May 19 to provide information about the international organization.

UKRAINE

Kiev Denies Rumor of Arms Sales to Iran

AU1905115093 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 18 May 93 p 2

[Commentary by Ihor Lyashenko: "Anti-Ukrainian Sentiments Are Already Flying in Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] Moscow newspapers picked up the information carried by the London OBSERVER of 9 May to the effect that Ukraine had allegedly sold eight cruise missiles to Iran. This is a sensational report, particularly in the context in which it is presented—the vigorous activity of Ukrainian diplomacy in Iran (recent visits by Vice Prime Minister Yu. Ioffe and Supreme Council Chairman I. Plyushch plus Ukraine's well-known interest in the deliveries of Iranian oil and gas). The OBSERVER information also mentioned a "Ukrainian-Iranian Agreement on Modernizing the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran" within the framework of which Ukraine is allegedly expected to sell to Iran a batch of fighter aircraft (including 50 MiG-29's), more than 200 T-72 tanks, and means for air defense.

Who did sell these missiles and is going to sell aircraft and tanks? Especially considering that Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, and some other countries are on the UN banning weapons deliveries?

"Not us," categorically declared Vasyl Nipak, head of the Press Service at the Ministry of External Economic Relations. "The Ministry of External Economic Relations does not trade in weapons."

The Ministry of Defense also denied any such involvement.

The minister of machine building, military-industrial complex, and conversion also spoke categorically: "These are not simply fabrications, but rather a political provocation. We do not have such an agreement with Iraq [country as published]. I will say openly that questions of supplying weapons to Iran were raised more than once during the negotiations. It cannot be ruled out that after the visits by our governmental and parliamentary delegations to Iran, these questions will be raised again. However, no signed documents exist, and no cruise missiles could be supplied through our ministry, at least because Ukraine does not have cruise missiles at its disposal. Ukraine does not even have any complete-cycle weapons industry on its territory, none whatsoever, including cruise missiles."

Yuriy Sergeyev, head of the Press Service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made this comment on the OBSERVER information: "This does not correspond to reality for many reasons. First, supersonic cruise missiles, such as those mentioned in the article, are nonexistent anywhere in the world. Second, Ukraine does not have sea-launched cruise missile at its disposal. The Black Sea Fleet has them, but it is not under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Regarding weapons sales in general, it certainly has the right to do this, with the exception, of course, of the restrictions imposed by interstate agreements and by the United Nations. However, today, there is no program for Ukraine's participation in the world weapons market. I also want to add that this is not the first time that Ukraine has been blamed erroneously for something that does not exist. We were already "trading" in weapons with the Republic of South Africa, with Sierra Leone, and with nonexistent Palestine (something that is totally unthinkable). In other words, this is yet another case of disinformation."

FRANCE

Report on Waste Disposal Sites Issued

93WP0153A Paris LE FIGARO in French
28 Apr 93 p 11

[Article by Jerome Strazzulla: "The First Map of Radioactive Waste Sites in France"]

[Text] A pretty word, that—"inventory." Its charm is the saving grace for a subject—radioactive waste—that is likely to lack that quality. The first inventory of radioactive waste in our national history was made public yesterday by the National Agency for the Management of Radioactive Waste (ANDRA). This thorough work, which involved a survey, region by region, of the sites that harbor radioactive waste, gives no cause for any real surprise. There has been no discovery of a barbarous discharge contaminated with radioactive mud, and no chest forgotten in an attic containing a prewar physician's radium needles has been found.

On the other hand, this inventory provides France with something it has done without during the decades in which it has been using radioactive substances—a record of its atomic waste. Such records are valuable, for one cannot rely on human memory in the nuclear field. The life of certain radioactive atoms is counted in thousands of years, while that of a human being is differently limited. The main purpose of the inventory is, therefore, to map our current waste sites for our great-grandchildren, who will still have to be dealing with them.

The law dated 31 December 1991 assigned the ANDRA, which had just been established as a separate agency independent of the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), the task of "inventorying the status and location of all of the radioactive waste in existence on the national territory." This law was passed after the discovery of the unauthorized dumping of contaminated waste at Bouchet and Saint-Aubin (1990) had awakened public opinion and roused the mastodons of the atomic industry, beginning with the CEA, that were responsible for this waste.

Radium-Coated Clock Hands

Since radioactivity is universal (because it also occurs in nature), and waste is omnipresent, the first action undertaken by the National Observatory team appointed by the ANDRA to deal with waste was to define radioactive waste. "All nuclear material regarded today as unusable by those who have possession of it"¹ was the formula determined. It does not set any upper limits, but the law, on the other hand, does establish a minimal threshold. Waste that has a ratio of activity to mass within 100 kilobecquerels per kilogram² is not regarded as radioactive. This allows diversity with a very broad range. The level of radioactivity of a small volume of nuclear waste at a university research center is about a thousandth of a

thousand times lower than that of the core of an atomic plant in bond in The Hague.

The ANDRA, in order to find its way through this generic heap of waste, in which some kinds are no more radioactive than the body of a radiologist who was working in the 1950s, while others will cause death within a few days, decided to classify them in 10 categories on the basis of their origins. They are nuclear power plants producing electricity (EDF [French Power Company] and its plants); uranium mines; processing plants (COGEMA [General Nuclear Material Company]); other nuclear enterprises (processing of uranium, production of nuclear fuels, installation maintenance); the CEA study centers; the ANDRA centers; obsolete installations (those of the CEA and the EDF in the process of being dismantled); small producers (industry, research, medicine); industries that are not nuclear (but use natural radionuclides); and, finally, waste sites.

Then, just as income statements are drafted, the institutions involved drafted lists of their radioactive waste materials, and all of this was supplemented by the critical opinions of the few credible "antinuclear lobbying" associations (the CRIIRAD and the GSIEN).

"The content of the report provides no great surprises, except, perhaps, for the novelty and clarity of the method," Henri Wallard, the general manager of the ANDRA, says by way of summary. "On the other hand, certain operators have become aware of the quality of their waste materials," the "Mr. Clean" of the atomic field went on to say.

A typical example is the old Bayard alarm-clock plant built in Dieppe in 1867, for example, which painted clock hands and faces with radium and tritium to facilitate telling time at night. The 3.7 gigabecquerels emitted by the 326 radium that is contaminating the earth today, the distribution lines, a number of tanks of solvent, and 10 200-liter drums of refuse and alarm-clock hands have now been transferred from the category of simple garbage to the category of radioactive waste.

A Deterrent Role

"We have reported everything that was brought to our attention. But I have no illusions about the exhaustive nature of this inventory. It represents only a first stage, and will need to be updated every year," Henri Wallard emphasizes. Two types of fish were inevitably filtered through the mesh of this first net. On the one hand, there were the sources of radioactivity used by doctors and researchers in the heroic years prior to the 1960s, an era in which the awareness of the risk was as primitive, more or less, as that in Russia today. The source of the other type of emissions may be the giants of the nuclear industry, whose owners, while they have for two decades made a practice of checking on their actions, were not necessarily aware of those of their predecessors, as has been evidenced precisely by the dumping at Bouchet and Saint-Aubin.

Footnotes

1. This definition excludes the COGEMA's fuels awaiting reprocessing and stocks of impoverished uranium, and the thorium resulting from the processing of rare earths (used for the catalytic exhaust chambers of the Rhone-Poulenc plant in La Rochelle. Where military nuclear materials are concerned, the CEA and the various armed branches are inventorying their own waste materials connected with the national defense sector.

2. Decree No. 66-450 dated 20 June 1966, amended by Decree 88-521 dated 18 April 1988.

GERMANY

Iran Urges Bonn To Help Build Military Industry

AU1905081593 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 14 May 93 p 2

[Report by Dietmar Seher: "Iran Urges Bonn To Help Build Its Military Industry"]

[Text] Iran is urging Bonn to provide assistance for the further construction of a nuclear and chemical weapons industry. The Federal Government refuses to do so.

According to information received by BERLINER ZEITUNG, the vice president of the Iranian Parliament, Ruhani, during his visit to Bonn in late April asked his hosts to complete the construction of major industrial projects in Iran that were suspended by Germany:

- The nuclear power plant of Busher, which Siemens/KWU built in the eighties and 90 percent of which is completed. Various components of the plant, which Tehran already paid for, are not released by Germany.
- A major production plant for pesticides for use by the agricultural industry, which was built by the Frankfurt-based Lurgi company. Seventy percent of the plant has been finished.

Western intelligence services and government circles assume that, if completed, both projects could be used for military purposes, too—for the production of plutonium and poison gas.

Iranian parliamentarians have claimed that Foreign Minister Kinkel, of the Free Democratic Party of Germany [FDP], promised a "positive examination" of the Iranian demand, after they offered Germany to carry out checks on location.

Sources in the Foreign Ministry have strongly denied this. On the contrary: It was made clear to the Iranians that a continuation of the construction of the plants is out of the question, the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Hanns Schumacher, said.

Iran's request to Bonn must be seen in an interesting light against the background of reports according to which Tehran wants to advance the production of

nuclear bombs and chemical and bacteriological arms. The Second German Television, ZDF, has reported that there have been frustrated and successful attempts to buy components from the German companies Thyssen, Magnetfabrik Bonn, Leybold, and Schenk. The buyers of the components were representatives of Tehran's Shefir University.

The coordinator for the intelligence services in the Chancellor's Office, Bernd Schmidbauer, assumes that Iran already has more than 1,000 chemical weapons and that "a few hundred" companies in all of Europe are to be included into the network of suppliers.

Iran has assured that it is only interested in the "peaceful use." The credibility of this statement is, however, challenged by Tehran's plan to buy missile launchers in North Korea for nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons with a range of 1,000 km—far enough to reach Israel.

TURKEY

Missile Defense System Sought

NC2005125393 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS
in English 15 May 93 p 3

[Text] Ankara—Turkey must strengthen its air force and acquire ballistic missile defense capabilities to face an increasing ballistic missile threat in its immediate neighborhood, a new book published by a government organization says.

The book, published by Turkey's Defence Industries Undersecretariat (SSM), which is in charge of executing the country's more than \$10 billion worth of joint defence industry projects, discusses the tactical shortcomings of the Patriot air defence system in intercepting ballistic missiles that were seen during the Gulf War, and argues for the deployment of at least one advanced defense system in Turkey, when they become available towards the end of the century.

Sitki Egeli, a strategist employed by SSM, has further argued in his book entitled, "Tactical Ballistic Missiles and Turkey," that the ballistic missiles available to Third World countries are obsolete and lack the accuracy needed to fulfill tactically significant strikes.

The SSM-sponsored work asserts that air power, in which Turkey is claimed to be enjoying a comparative advantage over its Middle Eastern neighbors, is a much more cost-efficient and flexible means of deterring a possible ballistic missile strike against Turkey.

Along this line of thinking, the book urges Turkish defense planners to divert more resources to the procurement of the so-called "force multipliers" for the air force, such as advanced standoff weapon systems, smart munitions, and aerial refueling and early-warning capabilities.

The study also urges the planners to consider procuring advanced strike aircraft, such as F-15Es and Tornados, to fulfill a "Scud-boosting" role. Scud-boosting is a term used to describe operations undertaken to decapitate the enemy's ballistic missile launchers before they can fire their missiles.

Patriot System Exaggerated

Concerning the Patriot air defense system, the study claims the system's highly-publicized Gulf War performance was exaggerated by both the U.S. Army and the system's developer, Raytheon, to convince the U.S. Congress to procure more of the systems and possibly to increase the Patriot's competitiveness in international markets.

The Patriot system is credited as a highly effective system when used against aircraft. But, when used in a ballistic missile defense role, the author contends that a number of technical and technological shortcomings, among them a low intercept altitude and the particular warhead type fitted to the interceptors, contribute to the unsatisfactory results attained by the system. Moreover, Patriot is claimed to be incapable of intercepting the newly-emerging air threats posed by the UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and low-flying cruise missiles, both of which are expected to be acquired by Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors by the turn of the century.

The book draws attention to the highly-destabilizing effects of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Turkey's three Middle Eastern neighbors, Iran, Iraq and Syria, are claimed to have developed a considerable ballistic missile production capability, and since the end of the Gulf War, it is claimed, those countries are trying to combine this capability with their NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons programs.

The author argues that the deployment of nuclear-tipped long-range ballistic missiles by any of its neighbors would constitute the most serious security concern for Turkey since the end of the World War II.

"Tactical Ballistic Missiles and 'Turkey' is the first of its kind in Turkey," asserts Defense Industries Undersecretary Vahit Erdem in the preface of the book. "It combines the strategic, technological, economic and foreign policy dimensions of the ballistic missile problem together in a comparative manner, and is expected in this way to make a significant contribution to the deliberations on the issue in Turkey," Undersecretary Erdem contends.

He affirms SSM's intention to inform the Turkish public on various defense and defense industry issues through such publications, and that the creation of platforms for discussion on defense matters would ultimately contribute to the efforts to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces and to create a modern defense industry infrastructure in Turkey.

UNITED KINGDOM

Government Will Not Replace Free-Fall Atomic Bombs

*LD1705155393 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1523 GMT 17 May 93*

[By PRESS ASSOCIATION Lords Staff]

[Text] The Government tonight signalled that it will not develop a replacement for Britain's free-fall atomic bombs and instead rely on Trident, the missile which takes over from Polaris as the main submarine-launched strategic nuclear deterrent.

Former defence minister Lord Mayhew (Lib Dem) [Liberal Democrat] said at Lords question time that it would be "much cheaper and better" to use Trident than to develop a new air-to-surface replacement for the WE177 bomb.

Junior Armed Forces Minister Lord Cranborne, who said an announcement was imminent, told him: "The point you have just made has played a very important part in our consideration of the decision we have to take."

A replacement for the bombs had been expected to be needed by the end of the century.

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